Colby College

Digital Commons @ Colby
Honors Theses

Student Research

2001

Civil War in Missouri: a look at Confederate guerrillas' four-stage
devolution
Drew Johnson
Colby College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses
Part of the History Commons

Colby College theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed or downloaded from this
site for the purposes of research and scholarship. Reproduction or distribution for commercial
purposes is prohibited without written permission of the author.
Recommended Citation
Johnson, Drew, "Civil War in Missouri: a look at Confederate guerrillas' four-stage devolution"
(2001). Honors Theses. Paper 128.
https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses/128
This Honors Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at Digital
Commons @ Colby. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ Colby.

The Civil War in Missouri:
A look at Confederate
Guerrillas' Four-Stage
Devolution
Drew Johnson
Senior Honors Project
May 20, 2001
Professor Leonard
Colby College

Taken From, Leslie, Edward. The Devil knows how to Ride: The True StOIy of William
Clarke Quantrill and his Confederate Raiders. New York. NY: Random House. 1996. P
84.

U

II

(I

~ ---- '1lIl"elilt.ern :DIIi. liIouri.
.
f~ II (I

--i

Eastern Kansas, taken from: Leslie, Edward. The Devil knows how to Ride: The True Story
of William Clarke Quannill and his Confederate Raiders. New York, NY: Random House.
1996. P 4.

~'j

(./

I~

J~.rJ

I~

~I

II

Ea.-ter~

...~

XaD.• • • '----I

II

! .
.~

H- \
-~

Johnson 1

Introduction
Today, many Americans are familiar with Jesse James, one of America's most
famous outlaws. James' feigB came to an, end on Apri13, 1882, when he was shot in the
back of the head, unarmed and in his own borne. The man who shot James was 20-year
old Bob Ford, kid-brother of Charlie Ford, a man with whom James had recently robbed a
bank. At the time ofhis .death, James had been an outlaw for over sixteen years. During
that period, consenrative estimates aecount him to have committe.d over 11 bank and train
robberies, as well as several murders. He died a poor, isolated ~ exhausted and
paranoid from living life on the run. 1
James' experience living Olltside the law did not begin after the Civil War,
however. In fact, James was a Confederate guerrilla in Missouri during the finaJI year and
a half of the war, rode with the most violent men of the period, and participated in almost

all of the gruesome atrocities of the war. James did not suddenly emerge from a vacuum
as a notorious outlaw but rather from a series of personal conflicts created and connected

to national conflicts over slavery, state's rights, and territorial expansion. In fact, James

was relatively unknown during the WaJi and served under commanders who influenced his
postwar behavior but did not attain his enduring fame.
Personal bitterness and cruelty characterized the Civil War in Missouri. It was a
conflict that, without exaggeration, lasted almost 1] years. The rising sectionalism of the
18505 played out most violently during neighboring Kansas' rise to statehood in the mid
to late 1850s. Missouri was a slave state and determined to see Kansas enter the Union
as a slave state as well. Since the decision rested on a vote by the people in Kansas,
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hordes of "border ruffians" from Missouri attempted to strong-arm election results. The
conflicts turned violent When the Civil War beg~ Missouri clung precariously to
conditional Unionism but soon their state government split One faction, lead by the
present governor, Claiborne Jackson, joined the Confederacy, while the Union recognized
St Louis as new Union capital. By the spring of 1862, Union forces had driven the
Confederate army from the state. ConfedeFate guerrillas remained, however, and the rest
of the war in Missouri .and Kansas was fought by Federal patrols, Confederate guerrillas
and Kansas's .abolitionists in a bloody, vengeful manner. General Robert E. Lee's
SUl]'ender in early April 1865· brought little closure to the Kansas-Missouri border war.
Emotions were seared. and the countryside was ravaged. The reconstruction period in
Missouri began in the same chaQS in which the war had ended.
Two Confederate guerrillas who led men Hke James, contributed immensely to the
bloodshed and hatred of the borde! war were WiHiam Clarke Quantrill and William
Anderson, Jr. Quantrill achieved a similar infamy to Anderson. Labeled the "bloodiest
man in America" by his fIrst biographer, William Connelley,. Quantrill has cut a wide

swath in American history and folklore. His most notable feat is the Lawrence, Kansas,
Massacre of August 25, 1863. Quantrill led over 400 Confederate guerrillas 40 miles into
Union patrolled Kansas to bum and pillage the abolitionist stronghold, killing over 180
civilians. Even after General!

tee surrendered to Union General Ulysses Grant at

Appomattox on Quantrill continued to fight for the Southern cause in the woods of
Kentucky.
William Anderson, Jr., was born in Kentucky in 1839 and moved to Missouri,
then Kansas during the late 18505. It was in these warring states that Anderson earned
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the moniker "Bloody Bil1." The sobriquet was aptly deserved, as Bloody Bill Anderson
participated in all the major guerrilla massacres in Missouri and Kansas. As the Civil War

dragged on and Missouri's particular brand of guerrilla fighting worsened, Anderson
became more violent and depraved. Not only did Anderson murder, but also he was
known for decapitating, scalping and castrating Union soldiers.
Because of men like Anderson and Quantrill and Union policy aimed at stopping
them, Missouri lay in ruins after the Civil War. Western Missouri was depopulated;
houses and barns lay in ashes; fields were ovemm with weeds and farming equipment sat
destroyed. Feelings of bitterness and hate remained on both sides. According to author
Micha,el
,. ~~ "the tenible grudge of neighbor against neighbor created in the guerrilla
;

conflict remained unsolved at the end of the war. No one apologized. No one forgave. tl2
What could have led to this

nrin and hatred? The answer lies in the escalation of

the border war on both the Confederate and Union sides and can be explained by a fourstage process of Confederate guerrilla degeneration. Integrity and enthusiasm on the part
of the Confederacy represented the first stage, when the future guerrillas were fighting
under regular Confederate command. The Civil War was new and both sides were
enthusiastic about their cause and the romantic notion of war masked the horrors of that
lay ahead. During- the War's beginning in Missouri, each side operated with military goals
and under military conduct. Even though civilian mobs from Kansas and Missouri looted
and burned, the character of the war was official: uniformed men from the Confederacy
met uniformed men from the Union on the battlefield. The second stage was the
beginning of the guerrilla conflict After the Confederate Army was driven from the state,
retaliatory events perpetrated by both sides began to replace the conventional character of
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the war. Guerrillas like Quantrill remained to fight in Missouri as pan of the Confederate
Army and paroled the Union forces they captured. In the third stage, the guerrillas began
to loose their official ties to the Confederacy and abandon the implicit rules of war. This
abandonment of conventional warfare in favor of a desperate struggle waged against Union
soldiers and civilians alike is marked by Quantrill's Lawrence massacre and Anderson's
killing sprees. Soo~ fewer and fewer prisoners were left aliv.e and civilians became
targets. The guerrillas were, however, still unified as shown by theIr mustering of over
400 men for ,the anack on Lawrence. During 1b.e winter of 1864-1865 and throughout the
rest of the war, the ,guerrilla war had entered its fourth and final stage of unmerciful
killings along with a loss of purpose and unity. No longer did the guerrillas have any
sense of duty to th.e Confederacy, nor respect for outsiders, nor discipline among
themselves. The end of the war found small bands of guerrillas roaming West-Central
Missouri and then finally Kentucky, robbing, looting and murdering.
i!

TIlls paper win examine the conflicting social and political forces in Missouri that
created its chaotic and violent identity before and during the Civil War. Missouri's brand
of conflict was a guerrilla war waged by Confederate irregulars. Central: to this irregular
war of and between the people were these four distinct stages of development In addition
to examining these four stages, the lives of five of the most violent and infamous
Confederate guerrillas will also be examined to serve as evidence of the four stages. Two of
these men, Bill Anderson and William Quantrill, achieved their notoriety during the war and
the other three, Jesse and Frank James and Cole Younger, achieved their notoriety after their
time as Confederate guerrillas, when they became as old west outlaws. lbrough analyzing
the guerrilla conflict in Missouri and Kansas through these stages, it shows that men like
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Quantrill and Anderson changed during the war in response to sUIT01mding events. These
men did not start off as violent murderers even though they may have ended the war as
such. In the conclusion, Confederate guerrillas' activity during the closing year of the war
resembled and laid the foundation for their post-war lives as outlaws-if they swvived past
Appomattox.

Prelude to War in Missouri and Kansas
As the Union expanded westward

mthe 19th century, the tensions between the

North and the South were constantly inflamed by the question of how to add new tenitory
while PreServing the existing political order. In order to gain a more broad and complete

unde~tandingof the violent events in Missouri and Kansas in the 1850s, looking back to
Missouri in1820 is essential. Missouri entered the Union as a slave state in 1820 as part of
a compromise that prohibited slavery north of the 36°30' parallel of the Louisiana Purchase.
This compromise avoided the slavery issue for a generation yet the issue would flare up
again during the 1850s-with Missouri being in the center of the issue again. 3
During the rise of sectionalism in the United States, Missouri presents a unique case
because the state shared characteristics with both the South and the North. Unlike the Deep
South. cotton was not king in Missouri but corn and hogs were: The landscape of
Missouri was dotted with yeoman farmers, a characteristic of the upper South and the
Midwest. Early colonists in the area were chiefly emigrants from Canada who were
engaged in the burgeoning fur industry of the early 1800s. Even though most of the actual
trapping took place north of Missouri in the Mississippi valley, settlements such as St.
Louis served as fur rendezvous and shipping centers. s As the population of Missouri

Johnson 6

increased and urban centers grew, Missouri remained largely agrarian, and, it stayed that
way through the Civil War. Before the Civil War, the average Missourian owned a 2IS-acre
family fann, owned no slaves, produced most of the family's subsistence needs and
purchased and sold products in the local service economy. As westward expansion
increased, S1. Louis businessman began to engage in wholesale supply to towns like
Franklin, Independence, S1. Joseph, and Kansas City. These towns, along with Missouri
farmers, profited from westward migration. Missouri fanners met the increased demand
and began to supply the increasing number of travelers. 6 As seen from this overview of
Missouri's development, it shared just as many similarities with Northern states like Ohio
and illinois than it did with states in which it shared the institution of slavery. This identity
crisis would contribute to the political division that would erupt as the country grew closer
to civil war.
Compared to many states in the upper south like Virginia, Missouri was

s911I~ely

,.

unpopulated and isolated from. the rest of the country. This landscape would later provide
ideal cover for guerrillas to hide in the ,expansive, thick and rugged regions of western
Missouri and avoid Federal patrols. By 'the mid 18405. along with other western centers
like lllinois, Missouri began its interest in rafuoad construction. Al'though farmers,
suppliers and manufacturers alike saw the economic benefit of railroads and the increased
land value they would bring, their financing proved difficult Even though the Missouri
Genernl Assembly, the state legislature of Missouri, essentially agreed on the development
of railroads, the wisdom of publicly financing the railroad was debated. The first railroad
reached St Louis in 1853.7 By 1855, however, only 100 miles of railroad was in existence
in Missouri, preserving the outlying areas' relative isolation. 8 Even though production was
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slow, the General Assembly continued to grant the sale of more and more public bonds and
by the beginning of the Civil War, Missouri had over 800 miles of operative raiJroads. 9
Like other slave states like Virginia and the Drrolinas, Missouri had a small nwnber
of plantations where slave owners were the exception compared to the largely non-slave
owning agrarian class. Missouri plantations that owned large numbers of slaves were only
found in a small area along the rich bottomland of the Missouri Ri ver. This class of citizens
was small in numbers yet politically powerful. During the early 1850s, they had allied with
the rising merchant class to produce what was termed the "boonslick democracy" named
after the town Booneville, located along the Missouri River. Realizing that their power was
not i~:, n~, they expanded their direction of appeal and championed Jacksonian ideals
in order to gain the support of the majority, the rural yeoman fanners. This change began
the agrarian masses vital addition of more formal support for the institution of slave labor
and an increasing southern conscious to their already established Jacksonian values of
individualism and states rights. While this political shift was taking place, Missouri began
to industrialize slowly in the 18405-18505 as 51. Louis began develop as a manufacturing
center and railroads began to connect rural traditional villages. IO Even though slavery was
not widely prevalent throughout Missouri, the fact that the state shared the institution with
other Southern states oriented Missouri with predominately southern sentiments.
As Missouri's economy developed, a merchant class emerged that sided with the
slave owning plantation owners but also brought in more Northern influences. With
infrastructure improvements came the decrease of household production and the increase of
bartering for goods along with "semi-cashn exchanges. As mentioned before, a small town
merchant class began to grow that soon politically linked themselves with the plantation
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owners of the Missouri River bottomland. II The yeoman reaction to the change in the
economic and social landscape can be characterized as ambivalent. "The yeoman farmers
viewed these changes as infringing but at the same time saw the profitability of the new
economic forces." 12 The economic development of Missouri had a subtle, yet effective,
influence on the rise of sectionalism. Not only did the rising yeoman class begin to
politically identify with the more established plantation owners, but also similarities with the
rapidly growing northern economy alienated this rising class. The more the Missouri
economy came to share classical attributes of the Northern economy, like indusnialism and
goods produced with free-market labor, the more Missouri began to be infused with the
growing abolitionist values of New England. Missouri's most populous and most
economically productive city, St Louis, was a hotbed of northern values like free labor due
to the large Irish and German immigrant population. Even though these populations antislave agenda was motivated by reasons that were chiefly economic, other more radical

....

?;

abolitionists from New England used this commonality to advance their cause. The rural
yeoman farmers of Missouri were not against economic development; it was the economic
changes that were concurrent with Northern social and political pressure that caused
reaction against the North's influence. The people of Missouri, save St Louis, were largely
agrarianists with Southern values. St Louis would continue to be the most Northern leaning
area of Missouri leading up to the Civil War and throughout the conflict
On the eve of the Civil War, the people of Missouri had strong ties to both Northern

and Southern influences. Even though the addition of Missouri to the Union was a solution
to the rising conflict between the North and South, the state was essentially a wilderness.
Political conflict within Missouri was minimal until the election year of 1844. 1844 marked
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the tim time in which Missourians were forced to deal with major national issues like the

future of slavery in tenitories. ''The national election of 1844 marked a maj,or step in
turning the national Democrats away from old Jacksonian values towards a party led by
Southerners who sought to direct its policy in the interests of slavery alild territorial
expansion."13 The issues that would create sectional tines between the nonh aDd the south
were beginning to be unearthed with the annexation of Texas. At the time, the annexation of
Texas from Mexico loomed larger than the issue of the expansion of slavery, though the
slavery question still surrounded the decision in a variety of ways. From the 1844 election
until the beginning of the Civil War, the struggle for ~titical power in Missouri wouJd
reflec~_ national
/..:

~

political trends.

The evolution of Missouri's political views and the erosion of compromise can be
shown in the example of Missouri senator Thomas Benton, a public figure who would
emerge as a principal player in the fifteen years of Missouri politics that led up to the Civil
War. Benton supported the annexation of Texas when the issue rose to national
prominence in 1844. However, he did not support how John Calhoun, President John
Tyler's secretary of state, approached the negotiation with Texas. Benton disagreed with
the "timing. procedure, and alleged motives of the promoters."14 Furthermore, he charged
that Calhoun was pressing annexation in order to advance the interest of slaveholders and to
disrupt the Union over the slavery issue. In contrast, Missouri Senator David Atchison, also
a principal political actor within the politics of the state leading up to the Civil War,
supported the immediate annexation of Texas. Benton had his roots deeper in the dated
Jacksonian values of individualism when Missouri was a wilderness on the frontier, and due
to his moderate cause, fell from Missowi favor in 1850, unlike the increasingly pro
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southern Atchison. On the issue of Texas, however, the two senators were able to reach a
compromise by agreeing that, ''Texas would be annexed at the earliest practical moment"IS
However, this political compromise, achieved in 1844, would mark the last time these two
men were able to reach a concession. The men grew increasingly polarized in their views
during the heated period before the Civil War and would stand in bitter opposition to one
another as sectionalism increased in Missouri and the United Sates in the 1850s.
When James Polk captured the Democratic nomination as a dark horse candidate
advocating annexation, and 'was subsequently elected President in 1844, Benton again
opposed Polk's action of initiating the entry of Texas into the Union by means of a joint
congressional resolution instead of diplomatic relations with Mexico. The general
sentiment of Missouri, however, matched the course of Polk because Missouri saw
economic opportunity and southern solidarity through Texas entering the Union. Through
Missouri identifying with Texas' political and economic appeal of entering the Union as a
~

-,

slave state, it furthered is growing Southern identity. The end result of this political
wrangling showed that the pro-south Atchison had more support throughout Missouri than
Benton did Furthennore, the statewide tenor that supported Atchison would provide the
framework for Missouri's aggressive campaign to strong-arm slavery into the settling
Kansas territory. It was at this juncture that Benton's political career began to be
characterized by his opposition to southern sentiment.
The politics of the 1844 election was the genesis of the conflict that would soon split
the Democratic Party into the Benton party of Unionists and the pro-southern Atchison
camp, and would later split Missouri. As the sectional conflict intensified, the politics of
Atchison would grow increasingly ultra-Southern, even though the men were both
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democrats. Benton warned in an address given in Jefferson City in May 1847 that slavery
could break parties along sectional lines and evenrually bring about the destruction of the
Union. Benton was prophetic in his address, but his political views feU from the democratic
consciousness in Missouri in favor of Atchinson's.'6
Much was happening in the national picture swrounding the increasing sectional
tensions. 1850 marked the year Senator Henry Clay, near his death, would leave his legacy
in a six-pan compromise. The bills that Congress passed that affected Missouri's situation
dealt with the admission of New Mexico and Utah as territories with slave codes. Upon
their entrance to the Union, slavery would be decided by their state constiwtion. The
intenqons of the compromises differed from how the newly passed bills ran their course
4,:

... ~

(despite California entering as a free state, its Congressional Representatives were pro-south
and pro-slavery) but the bill prolonged the sectional conflict.'?
When the re-election year of Benton was approaching in 1850, a group of AntiBenton forces convened in the Missouri General Assembly to pass what came to be known
as the Jackson Resolutions, laws that upheld Missouri's growing Southern conscience.
The Jackson Resolutions stated that Congress could not legislate on the subject of slavery
in the tenitories, only the people of the territories could decide at the time of statehood, on
the right to prohibit slavery. The Jackson Resolutions mirrored popular sovereignty, the
policy that would engulf Kansas and Missouri into a bloody guerrilla struggle even before
the Civil War. The Resolutions said that as a result of the conduct displayed by the
combatant northern states, the southern states did not have to adhere to the Missouri
compromise. The Jackson Resolutions also stated that when futwe tensions and conflict
arose surrounding slavery and the northern states, Missouri would cooperate with the
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southern states in order to assure mutual protection against northern fanaticism. The final
clause of the resolution stated that all Missouri senators and representatives were instructed
to act in conformity with the resolution.
With the exception of Benton and his followers, the Jackson Resolutions illustrated
the change of prerogatives of the Democratic Party of Missouri. Once surrounded by
issues that involved the public issuing of bonds in order to finance the construction of
railroads and land rights. the Democratic party of Missouri that was founded on Jacksonian
values had evolved away from the less complicated and less volatile time of early statehood
Benton adamantly disagreed with the resolutions and began to plan a series of speeches that
were to be delivered to audiences from across the state denouncing the resolutions. Benton
argued that the Resolutions did not represent the true voice of the people and they promoted
dissension in Missouri and national disunion. The extent to which Benton was correct in
his view of the resolutions is uncertain; however, the increasingly radical stance he was
taking was largely unsupported by the people of Missouri, especially the farmers. The
election of 1850 saw Benton's long and influential senate career come to an end. Replacing
him was Henry Geyer, a lawyer from St Louis who was able to find a middle road between
Benton and the anti-Benton candidate James Green. ls The issues that surrounded Benton
when he was first elected to Missowi's senate seat in 1820 were considerably different
from the hostile political landscape that surrounded his defeat The slavery question and
expansionism were the hot-bunon issues that confronted Missouri in the 18505. It is
doubtful that the word 'secession' was ever used surrounding regional political parlance
when Benton first came to his senate seat, but by 1850, debates surrounding the
constitutionality of secession reflected the rising sectional tensions.
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The rights of slaveholders to carry their slaves to new territories was an issue that
further divided the nation and surrounded the Missouri political scene in the early and mid
1850s. A fomer slave, Dred Scott, sued his owners' heirs for his freedom citing that
because his master had brought him into a free state, Dlinois, and a free territory, Wisconsin,
he was indeed free on grounds of the Missouri Compromise. The Dred Scott case's first
stop on its way to the Supreme Court was a Missouri State court. In March 1852, in a 2-1
decision, the court ruled that state courts were not required to heed the laws of other states
and congressional legislation controlling the territories. 19 Free soilers in Kansas and Prosouthern forces in Missouri did not wait until 1857, when the Supreme Court fmally handed
down,~e~

,-

Scott decision to act violently in the name of their causes. The Supreme



Court had envisioned laying the question of the legal status of slavery in the territories to
rest but only succeeded in increasing the sectional conflict.

In the same year that the Dred Scot case began, Missourians elected Sterling Price
as Governor on a democratic ticket whose platform was purposely moderate and vague on
the slavery issue. Price would later become a pivotal figure in the Civil War in Missouri as
a Confederate General who encouraged guerrilla warfare after his armies were driven from
the state. This election coincided with the organization of the Nebraska and Kansas
territories by Congress. The national debate over the extension of slavery into the territories
would have serious implications in Missouri throughout the rest of the decade. After a
series of territorial organization acts failed, the Kansas-Nebraska act finally navigated its
way lhrough the United States Congress in the spring of 1854. The Kansas-Nebraska Act
began initially as an attempt to organize the area northwest and west of Missouri as
Nebraska territory. As with the tenitorial expansion of New Mexico and Utah, it renewed
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the dispute over slavery in the territories in a manner that would tum violent.

"The

Kansas-Nebraska measure was the major national question of its time, but probably in no
state did it create greater public excitement than in Missouri. H2O Angering some Northern
Democrats, the Missouri Compromise of 1820 that prohibited slavery north of 36°30' was
repealed and Nebraska was divided inw Kansas and Nebraska. These Democrats could not,
however, vote on the issue from a principled anti-slavery stance. Senlers (voters) were
hungry for new land and added to the push of manifest destiny that would outweigh the
chance for slavery to expand. Therefore, popular sovereignty was going to decide the fate
of slavery in the territories. Reflecting on the fact that a regional election would decide the
future of slavery in Kansas, Senator Atchison advised his pro-slavery cohorts that, "the
game must be played boldly."21
After the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the question of slavery transcended
_
political debate and turned violent Nebraska offered slaveholders little geographic
.......:.-

l
{,

attraction; it bordered no Southern states and only the area bordering Kansas was suitable
for farming. As a result, its free-soil settlement was not a debated issue. 22 Kansas, on the
other hand, was a different story. The aggregate number of slaves in Western Missouri was
around 50,000, almost a third of the slave population in the state. Their owners were
concerned that if Kansas entered the Union as a free state, Missouri would be surrounded
on three sides by free-soil providing convenient haven for nmaways. Funhermore, a free
Kansas would in effect block the Westward expansion of slavery as well. In the prophetic
words of Atchison, the future of slavery in the United States depended on the fate of
Kansas. 23
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The majority of Missourians embraced the Kansas-Nebraska act and popular
sovereignty. This time Benton, serving as a United States representative from a district that
included St. Louis, was outspoken against the Kmtsas-Nebraska act. Benton was alone in
his dissent as all other Missouri senators and representatives supported the act. As a result
of the Kansas-Nebraska act.. the Whig party, while not having that strong of a presence in
Missouri, was further weakened by the rise of the slavery issue and expansionism,
providing fertile ground for a new political party that would be founded. on the slavery issue:
the Republican Party.
The fight over sectionalism and the future of slaves and southern values was not

limireq... to""+the Senators and Congressmen of Missouri and their free-soil foes.

The struggle

between the citizens of Missouri and Kansas that began in 1854 would foreshadow the
vengeful violence of the Civil War in Missowi and Kansas. As early as 1854, the civil strife
that began along the border between Missouri and Kansas illustrated that the war between
the two was going to be a war of the people-not just politicians and words. These bitter
feelings between pro-slavery factions and free-soilers were created and exacerbated by the
politics of the era. Central to the newly formed Republican Party was their free-soil
commitment to the Wilmot Proviso. The Wilmot Proviso, named after a Pennsylvania
Congressman David Wilmot, had further split the country down sectional lines when it
declared that slavery would be illegal to the expanding territories back in 1846. Until the
mid 1840s, the question of slavery had been largely avoided in the federal government
because it was an institution controlled at the stale level. Presently, however, the question of
slavery confronted the Federal Government in a number of ways due to rapid westward
expansion and because the unorganized territories were under Federal controls.24
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Michael Fellman writes, ''the popular northern ideological thrust [of anti-slavery
propaganda} against rural southern whites in the 18505 came to bear particularly on
Missourians in the period of 1854-1856."2s The decision for popular sovereignty
represented by the Kansas-Nebraska Act increased sectional tensions in Kansas and
. Missouri because the issue of the spread of slavery seemed to be a matter under the direct
influence of Mi ssouri and Kansas's citizens. Senator Atchison of Missouri ill ustrated the
sentiments of rural Missourians in the face of rising free-soil immigration to Kansas when
he said. "A set of fanatics and demagogues, a 1000 miles off, can afford to advance their
money and exert every nerve to abolitionize the territory and exclude the slaveholders when
they have not the least personal interest"Z6 What Atchison referred to through partisanship
was the New England Emigrant Aid Company, a company that was started in 1854 to help
finance free...soil settlers in Kansas?? Missouri was being used as a battleground for the
nation's varying opinions on slavery. Senator Atchison was clear that Missouri ~!:lt th.e
intense heat of being under the national spotlight The conflict between pro-slavery and
anti-slavery values was being exacerbated by the forced settlement of Kansas. In response
to the aggressive antagonism of the abolitionists' voice and presence, it was Atchison who
organized pro-slavery Kansas settlers. The result of action on both sides was a clear line of
sectionalism and accompanying violence.
Even before a part of Kansas was opened up to settlement, land-seeking men were
already crossing the border and squatting on claims. Rivalries over claims ensued over
universal frontier issues like water righlS and sporadic violence erupted. Often, claims were
disputed between pro-slavery and free-soil parties. "Organized efforts by both northern
and southern elements to promote their respective interest in Kansas worsened the difficult
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simation. ,,28 A hoard of Missourians fIrst crossed the Kansas border to "participate" in
the Kansas territories' United States Congressional elections of 1854. Even though census
reports indicate only 3,000 eligible voters, over 6,500 votes were casL 29 The 'border
ruffians," a descriptor that Atchison gave the men he led and that inadvertently stuck,
achieved their goals and a pro-slavery ~torial delegation was sent to Washington. The
free-sailers of Kansas responded by convening a free-state constitution to counter the proslavery legislation that was forming. Essentially Kansas now had two territorial
governments and., initially, Washington recognized the pro-slavery forces until the 1857
election was recognized as unjust and then placed free-sailers in control for the remainder
of peIj,od until the Civil War. 30

..

~-

Violence between the two sides continued and an entirely new level of animosity was
established after pro-slavery forces raided the "free-soil capital" of Lawrence, Kansas, in
May of 1856 in a prelude of a later, infamous attack by William Quantrill. The events that
preceded the raid look place while United States Marshal Israel B. Donaldson was serving
indictment papers cast by a Missouri based grand jury. Donaldson met resistance while
trying to arrest two men in Lawrence. Atichson was quick to provide Donaldson the clout
he needed and formed a group of pro-slavery men to ride to Lawrence and allow Donaldson
to make the arrests. Much to the disappointment of Atchison and his men, the Marshal
dismissed the men. Missouri Sheriff Sam Jones, frustrated with the free-soil intransigence
and Marshal Donaldson's ambivalence, led Atchison's men and sacked Lawrence by
throwing two newspaper presses into the river, burning two homes, and torching the "Free
State HoteL,,)1
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The raid on Lawrence triggered fury from a man who by the outbreak of the war
was a folk hero in the North. Complete with his long-bearded Old Testament look., John
Brown believed ~n "an eye for an eye."

Infuriated over the sack of Lawrence, Brown's

obsession with violent revenge was further provoked after Preston Brooks' caning of
Charles Sumner on the floor of the u.s. Senate-. "Striking a blow for freedom" Brown led

his four sons and two others on a raid of a Missouri settlement near Dutch Henry's
Crossing at Pottawatomie Creek., where they murdered five unarmed men. B-rown's anack
was an early example of citizens resorting to violence, and intensified the pro-slavery hatred.
Missourians responded by destroying Brown's town of Osawatonee, though Brown was
never caught 32
According to lame:s McPherson, this butchery "launched a full-scale guerrilla war
in Kansas."n Until President James Buchanan replaced Kansas's territorial governor,
Wilson Shannon, with John Geary and he was able to negouate a truce before winter, almost
200 people died. 34 The Viiolence was renewed after 1857 when bands of Kansas
Jayhawkers, profit-seeking abolitionists named after an imaginary bird, repeatedly raided
Missouri's western counties. Started in the name of aboli'lionism, these raids degenerated
into expeditions of robbery and destruction. The governors from both states responded by
sending federal troops to patrol the state's borders. It was only after each state took these
extreme measures that

me raiding Jayhawkers and Border Ruffians would subside until the

outbreak of the Civil War.
Added to this mix, of course, were the aggressive ~soil settlers, whom one
wimess described as "men from the North with wagons that contained no visible furniture,
agricultural implements or mechanical tools but abound in the requisite articles for camping
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and campaigning purposes."3S Why did the debate over popular sovereignty take on its
violent and bitter personality in Missouri? In short, Missouri realized that its location left it
uniquely suited to decide the pressing question of slavery in Kansas and the rest of the
territories. "In population, wealth and industrial capacity the South in general had fallen
behind the North and was increasingly conscious of its minority status."36 The rise of
abolitionism had agitated Southern sentiments and pushed even the more Unionist-by
compromise sentiments of rural Missourians in the direction of more aggressive
secessionist-like sentiments. The abolitionist campaign of denunciation of the Southern,
and especially the Missouri, lifestyle "lacerated southern feelings as never before.'137 In
additiQp, ~.idea of popular sovereignty amounted to political power through grassroots
I

,

action. The men on the frontier could speak not only with their vote, but also through
intimidation and violence.
On the eve of the election of 1860, the same divisive forces that fortified

sectionalism nationally tore Missouri. A state that began on the frontier of America,
Missouri and its populace's essentially agrarian and Southern values had been confronted
with considerable economic development and northern influence, contributing to an identity
crisis. The Jacksonian political ideology that had grounded the state through a series of
national compromises over slavery had disintegrated in the 1850s. The strong ties that
Missourians had to their values and institutions as well as the pressure from Kansas and
other northern influences heightened emotions and eroded the political center of moderation
and compromise. All of these factors fed into the violence C0mmitted by the Border
Ruffians and Jayhawkers. Although these factors did not decide Missouri's future as a
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Confederate or Union state, they promised that the coming war would only intensify and
amplify the chaos, bloodshed and hatred that had characterized the 18505.

The Civil War
Claiborne Jackson, an aggressive southern sympathizer, was elected governor of
Missouri in 1860. Jackson's past reflected his Southern leanings: he had led border
ruffians into Kansas to "participate" in their first territorial elections. It was Jackson that
first bestowed the name "Border Ruffians" on Southern leaning Missourians who caused
trouble in Kansas. Also, Jackson had adamantly denounced the New England Emigrant Aid
Society efforts to populate Kansas with free-soilers. Upon the bombardment of Fort
Sumter in April of 1861, recently elected RepUblican President Abraham Lincoln called for
federal troops from Missouri. Jackson responded defiantly, "your requisition is illegal,
unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, diabolical, and cannot be complied with."n
il

Jackson moved quickly to secure Missouri in the Confederacy through appointing Sterling
Price to head soldier recruitment, before Unionist forces could build
Though his Southern leanings were strong, Jackson did not seek out to immediately
have Missouri secede from the Union. Part of his hesitation may have been economic: At
the time of South Carolina's secession from the Union in December 1860, Missouri, like
the rest of the states, was becoming economically stagnant due to the political uncertainry
surrounding the nation. Many workers in the industrial capital of St. Louis lay idle and all
banks, save one, had suspended specie payment 39 Newly elected Governor Jackson voiced
his Southern nationalism, though he believed Missouri's secession from the Union was
cursory. The governor stated,
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So far as Missouri is concerned, her citizens have ever been devoted to the
Union, and she will remain in it so long as there is any hope that it will
maintain the spirit and guarantees of the Constitution. But if the Northern
States have determined to put the slave-holding States on footing of inequality,
then they have themselves practically abandoned the Union, and will not
expect our submission to a government on terms of inequality and
subordination. 4O
Jackson,like St. Louis free-soil Congressman Frank Blair, believed that St. Louis
and its federal arsenal of 60,000 muskets, 200 powder barrels and other war implements,
was of principal importance during the chaos and uncertainty of the spring of 1861. On the
eve of the bombardment of Fort Sumter, Jackson took control of the S1. Louis police
through the appointment of an independent police board. In response, Congressman Blair
and Mayor Oliver D. Filley began to organize the large German American free-soil
contingenSl of 51. Louis into "Home Guard" units. Not to be outdone, Jackson's
l.

•

Lieutenant Governor Thomas Reynolds organized secessionists into units of minutemen.
"Soon both outfits were drilling secretly in various halls around the city.'''·
Mirroring the nation, many volatile issues were coming to a head in Missowi and
especially in St. Louis. The General Assembly, dominated by Breckenridge Democrats and
Douglas Democrats, approved an election to determine a special state convention early that
year. The convention members were still opposed taking any measure as extreme as
secession. With the exception of four delegates elected from S1. Louis, the newly elected
members of the convention were not free-soilers or adamant secessionists. The key issues
were the protection of slave property and the preservation of Southern rights. As already
noted, Missouri was different in its makeup from many of the states that had already
seceded, such as Virginia and South Carolina No plantations existed in Missouri that were
similar in size to the large tobacco plantations in the Deep South. The per capita slave
population had decreased from one in four 30 years earlier to one in nine. Ultimately
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secession, the convention decided, would further 'cripple the Missouri economy at the time
of this national insurrection.42
Missouri's feelings or Unionism remained delicately intact, though the stale was
unable to maintain its stance of conditional unionism for long. As in many civil wars and
revolutions, the political and social center of Missouri disappeared in the surrounding
violence, panic and extremism. Unable to sit on the SecessionlUnionism fence the
circumstances forced tough choices on citizens and politicians alike. Though most of rural
Missouri was sympathetic to the Southern cause and slaves stiU populated the countryside,
Sf. Louis was a political powder keg because of its strong free..soil element Perhaps
predictably, events in St Louis knocked Missouri from its cautious Unionist stance and
propelled it down its bloody and fratricidal path.

In St Louis, Congressman Blair removed General William Harney from command
at the federal arsenal, Jefferson Barracks, and promoted a Connecticut born free-sailer
.

~

~

I

Captain Nathaniel Lyon in late April 1861. Before being transferred to Jefferson Barracks
in S1. Louis, Lyon was stationed in Kansas during the late 18505 and witnessed first

han~

the violence of the Border Ruffians. The appointment of an ardent Unionist to be the
commander of a federal arsenal within a slave-holding state but in a city with Unionist
majority would clearly produce, as it indeed did, conflict and pro-Union action on the part of
Lyon. 43
Sensing the importance of the stockpile of arms now under his control, Lyon armed
four German American regiments into Federal service and shipped the rest of the arms
across the Mississippi to Illinois. The creation of the American Home Guards, made up of
German and Irish immigrants, "increased tension in [St Louis].'>44 In response to the
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arming of German-Americans, who were resented by nativist Missourians because of their
rising political power and economic based free-soil views, the secessionist element in 5t
Louis appealed to Governor Jackson for counter-action. On the same day that Jackson
refused to provide Lincoln with Federal vohmteer troops from Missouri, he secretly met
with secessionist troop commander General Frost and ordered him to gather troops and
begin military training throughout the state. 4S
Jackson hoped that mustering troops from the area surrounding 51. Louis would
serve as a decoy to Lyon and allow Frost to capture Jackson Barracks and secure arms and
militMy supplies for the Southern cause. Frost camped a complement of 700 militia on a

hill ea.s,t of the federal arsenal. Jackson, upon Frost's urging. petitioned the newly seceded
h

':"-

Virginia for armaments. The Confedernte government reS,pOnded and a: total of thirty-two
cannons arrived from Virginia 46 Using his new police board. Governor Jackson demanded
that Genera] Lyon leave the federal arsenal. Lyon refused the order and begaR to prepare

for an assault. The encampment of secessionist militia now named Camp Jackson, did not
attack. 47
Instead of waiting for the possibility of Frost attacking Jefferson Barracks. Lyon
moved on the 700 militia stationed at camp Jackson. On May

~O.

1861, Lyon surrounded

Camp Jackson and the outnumbered Confederate militia surrendered. The Union officers
placed the militia under arrest and marched them through 5t Louis back to Jefferson
Barracks. The polarized and Wlstable atmosphere of the city produced a raucous crowd.
Many cheered for Jefferson Davis and harangued the German American soldiers by calling
them "Hessians." Others turned out to cheer the Union anny.48
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The tense situation reached its critical mass when a drunk: tried to cross the line of
marching Union soldiers. After being roughed up, the man brandished a pistol and
according to some sources he shot a Union officer while other sources say he fired an
errant shot toward the Home Guards. Either way, the Federal! Soldiers responded by firing
a volley over the heads of the protesting crowd. A fracas ensued., rioters organized and
continued throughout the night Nearly thirty people lay dead before nightfall. 49
War had now come to the frontier state. According to Pcurish, the melee "forced

Missourians to get off the fence and make immediate personal choices...so Much of the
Union sentiment dissolved across Missouri as news of the incident at Camp Jackson
spread. Former Governor Sterling Price, once a Conditional Unionist, was appointed to the
command of Missouri's Confederate troops and would lead them for the remainder of the
war and continue even after Lee's surrender at Appomattox.

William Clarke Quantrill

"

Perhaps ironic in light of the blood, mayhem and destruction that followed William
Clarke Quantrill as he navigated the Kansas-Missowi border during the Civil War,
Quantrill was born to uninteresting parents under the most unsensational circumstances.
Nevertheless, by the fall of 1863, the name Quantrill conjured fear and hatred among
Unionists as well as arousing feelings of admiration and heroism among Confederate
supporters. Besides the fact that he was born in Canal Dover, Ohio, on July 31, 1837, to a
homemaker and a tinsmith-turned-school administrator, little detail is know of Quantrill's
early childhood Many of the fIrst pulpy novels that appeared around the turn of the
century paint Quantrill as a sadistic child having few friends. For example, Quantrill
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reportedly took pleasure in capturing and mutilating rabbits, frogs and snakes as a young
child. In addition, some have claimed Quantrill killed his first man when he was but 18 as a
lumber yard clerkafter the assailant tried to rob him. No facts back these stories up and
they are a result of sensational writing and attempts to explain his later violent acts in terms
of a cruel and sadistic childhood. The literature that abOlmded after the war on Quantrill
and his Confederate raiders ties into the cultural need and proclivity towards folklore and
heroes. It is as easy for people of the period to answer the question of "why" in terms of a
troubled childhood or in the case of a southern persPeCtive, as noble man questing to avenge
terrible wrongs
committed against
his people by rabid Unionists.
'J
~

What is known of his life before his involvement in the Civil War is based primarily
~..!

upon his first accredited biographer, William Connelley, who wrote Ouantrill and the
Border Wars in 1910. Much ,of Connelley's treatment of Quantrill before the Civil War is
based on a series of letters that QuantriM sent his mother during his Western travels. While
the book atrtempts to give an objective aceoWlt of Quantrill's life, Connelley's pro-Kansas
and pro-Unionist feelings emerge and make his analysis biased and slanted. As a result of
Quantrill's father working in education as well as his own inherent ability, Quantrill was a
good swdent and began to teach school at age sixteen,. Quantrill's father died in December
1854 of consumption when Quantrill was eighteen. In order to make ends meet, the
Quantrills began taking in boarders and Quantrill continued teaching. Hoping to win
enough bread to end his mother's boarding business. Quantrill traveled around the area
surrOlmding Canal Dover but only could find jobs as a teacher. When Quantrill had the
chance to travel to Kansas in .February 1857 with a group of Canal Dover citizens, he took
the chance. Working a land claim bought by two former Canal Dover citizens, Colonel
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Henry Torrey and Harmon V. Beeson, Quantrill encouraged his mother to sell their home in

Ohio and move to Kansas to purchase land. Before Quantrill's mother could move to
Kansas, Quantrill, still poor and unable to send any money home, was suspected of stealing
supplies from a local settlement, Tuscarora Lake. 51 Quantrill's theft continued and then he
was caught with a yoke of Torrey's oxen. He returned the oxen and was banished from the
settlement and drifted to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Quantrill joined an army expedition to
Utah as a teamster under the command of General Alben Sidney Johnston, a future

Confederate General who died leading forces in the battle of Shiloh. The expedition arrived
in Salt Lake City in October 1857. Quantrill sent an optimistic letter to his mother and
sister in Canal Dover assuring them, "You need not expect me home till you see me there,
but bear in mind that I will do what is right, take care of myself, and try to make a fortune
honestly, which I think I can do in a year or twO."S2
Throughout the winter in Utah, Quantrill's letters become tess optimistic. Although
..:...

he landed a job as an assistant Quartermaster that paid fifty dollars a month, he soon lost the
job and was reduced to working as a mess hall cook. Quantrill tells his mother about plans
on traveling to the Colville gold mines in Canada and assures his mother not to "grieve any
more than possible" and to realize that ",someday he would be worth something-don't
fear."S3 Instead of traveling to Canadian gold mines however, Quanlrill traveled Ito Pike's
Peak., Colorado, and both the trip and the mining proved harrowing. Out of the nineteen
men in the expedition that left Salt Lake City, only seven smvived. Added to tlle hardship of
the trip, the mining was not profitable either. Soon Quantrill was back in Lawrence, his
traveling companion and horse shot by Indians on [the rerom trip. Quantrill then returned to
Stanton, Kansas, and began teaching. Four years of Western travels had hardened Quantrill
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and left him no further ahead fmancially than when he first went west. The austerity and
disaster of the trip from Salt Lake City to Pike's Peak, Colorado, must have added to his
frustration but more importantly foreshadowed and demonstrated his ability to survive.
Quantrill did not succumb to starvation, mountain winters, Indian attacks or yellow fever
even though he was threatened by each. During the Civil War and his days as a Jayhawker
leading up to it. Quantrill was the most wanted man on the Missouri-Kansas frontier.
Thousands of Union patrols, home guard units and militia never once captured or killed the
Confederate Guerrilla Captain. After being hlD1ted for over five years, it was a man similar
to the company Quantrill kept that would finally end the life of, according to Connelley. the
"bloo4iest~q}a!l in American history."j4
t_

."

Quantri Il's days of teaching upon his return from the West in the summer of 1859
were marked with a growing sense of uncertainty and angst He had little to show for his
hard life and he had failed as a provider for his aging mother and sister. Quantrill
questioned himself as well as his pwpose. The following excerpt is the most frequently
quoted passage from the next to last letter he ever wrote his mother. It illustrates his
feelings and offers a dark and brooding foreshadowing of the future. Quantrill's eloquent
and grim prose reflects on the nature of the surrounding country (Missouri and Kansas) by
asserting his own free will over the promise of frontier life. Horse and slave stealing and
double-crossing would soon trump Quantrill's past petty blanket thievery.
There is no news here but hard times, and harder still coming, for I see their
shadows; and "coming events cast their shadows before" is an old proverb.
But I do not fear that my destiny is fixed in this country, nor do I wish to be
compelled to stay in it any longer than possible, for the devil has got
unlimited sway over this territory.55
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At the conclusion of the school term in 1860, Quantrill headed for Lawrence and
would not retwn to teaching again. Quantrill held no job and fell into company with both
Border Ruffians and Jayhawkers. Similar to Bill Anderson, these men capitalized on the
conflict between abolitionislS and pro-slavery forces and the surrounding chaos of the area
for their own advantage. Specifically, these men would engage in capturing free blacks and
selling them into slavery or kidnapping slaves and then re-selling them to their masters for a
reward Between the time Quantrill taught his last term and degenerated into a border
outlaw, Castel writes, "Quantrill ran foot races, wrestled, gambled, and drank with his new
found friends, who soon accepted him as one of their own kind-which, in fact, he soon
became. ,,'6
During the fall of 1860 and the winter of 1861, Quantrill began to playa dangerous
double game between the anti-slavery Jayhawkers and the pro-southern Border Ruffians.
As an example, Quantrill assembled a group of Jayhawkers and led them on a came raid in
,

.......

..
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Western Missouri. After seizing a number of head of cattle, Quantrill slipped away from
the Jayhawkers and aroused the farmers whose cattle were just stolen. Leading a posse of
insolent farmers Quantrill caught up to the Jayhawkers driving the cattle and a short
gunfight ensued. Unable to stop them, the Jayhawkers crossed the Kansas border and sold
the cattle to Kansas settlers. Quantrill then appeared in Lawrence a few days later and
claimed his share of the spoils! His alibi was that he had become lost and disoriented in the
dark and in order to elude the farmers, Quantrill took the most roundabout way back to
Lawrence. While his Jayhawking partners were suspicious, they paid Quantrill his share
just the same. 51
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After Quantrill's bloodiest and largest double-cross, he was unable to ride the fence
between Jayhawkers and Border Ruffians. He soon emerged as a hero within Jackson
County, Missouri, for aiding in the ambush of three Jayhawkers, and loathed among
Jayhawking circles. Historians of the period and of Quantrill call this episode the Morgan
Walker raid, named after a rich Jackson County farmer. Quantrill assembled a band of
Jayhawkers with the intention to raid Walker's farm. Many turned Quantrill's plan down
citing its danger and the cold weather of December as the reason why it was a suicide
mission. Nevertheless, Quantrill teamed up with a group of abolitionist Jayhawkers, former
Quakers from Springdale, Iowa, named Charles Ball, Chalkey Lipsey, and Edwin S.
Morri~~n. All men

had once listened to the orations of John Brown and it was he who had

"
influenced their settling in Kansas to fight the abolitionist crusade. After two days' travel,
the men had camped in a thicket about a mile away from the farm of Morgan Walker.
Quantrill left the group under the pretense that he was going to scout the farm.~8
After anlving at the farm. Quantrill approached the house and asked for Walker.
Only his son, Andrew Walker, was home at the time yet Quantrill confided his plan to the
surprised son. Quantrill told the young man that a group of Jayhawkers would soon be
approaching the house looking to steal slaves, horses, cattle and money. Quantrill
suggested setting an ambush for the Jayhawkers: two men hid behind a loom on the porch
and two hid in an adjoining harness house.59 His only stipulation was to allow him to get
out of the way. Andrew Walker alerted five neighbors and they lay in ambush for the
Jayhawkers. Morgan Walker had returned home and he was also notified of the plan. As
planned, Quantrill and his band approached the Walker farm and the four men went inside
and demanded money. At the suggestion of Quantrill, he remained inside covering the
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Walkers, and the three men left for the barn to gather horses. When the three men were
seen leaving the house, Walker's neighbor John Tatum emptied his shotgun into Morrison
and he died instantly. Due to the darkness and confusion, Ball and Lipsey were able to
escape d~pite Lipsey receiving a "nasty wound in the groin.'060
Quantrill had pulled off his double cross with impunity. He remained at the Walker
fann while the band of men hunted for the two surviving Jayhawkers. Ball and Lipsey
managed to escape yet were unable to travel far from the Walker farm. While encamped in
a thicket, a neighbor and his slave spotted the two Jayhawkers while they were out cutting
wood. The location of the two Jayhawkers was passed along to the Walkers and Quantrill
and they descended on the camp where Lipsey lay on a bed of leaves in agony and Ball
squalled over a fire. Morgan Walker shot Ball while he was reaching for his pistol and
Quantrill shot the helpless Lipsey through the head. Quantrill had come a long way since
his days of blanket stealing in Kansas almost four years ago.

l

"

The story passed through the community quickly and Quantrill became a local hero
of sorts to some as well as a suspicious outsider. Quantrill was arrested by the Jackson
County sheriff and taken to Independence for questioning. Satisfied with his answers, no
charges were pressed against Quantrill. yet many were still suspicious of his activity
because of his connection with the Jayhawkers. Andrew Walker helped diffuse a lynch
mob by insisting that Quantrill. would only be killed over "his dead body." To show their
gratitude, Morgan Walker gave Quantrill a horse, saddle and $50 in cash and Quanttill

stayed at the Walkers' and with neighbors just in case other Jayhawkers should seek
revenge for Morrison, Ball and Lipsey. Quantrill soaked in the attention and it was here that
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he concocted a story of how he acquired his Pro-Southern sentim~ts and come to hate
Unionists. 61
According Ito Quantrill's tale, he was bom in Maryland and while traveling west
through Kansas, his older brother and he were ,ambushed by Jayhawkers. His older brother
was killed while he was wo\!lt)ded and left for dead Luckily Quantrill, after beating off
buzzards from his brother's body, was found by an Indian named Spiebuck and nursed
back to health. Upon recovering from ,his wounds, Quantrill lurked among the Jayhawkers
in order to avenge the death of his brother. Morrison, Ball and Lipsey were, according to
Quantrill, ,the last Jayhawkers he needed to kill in order to finally settle the score. As shown
by QUtP.\tril 's eadier life, the major facts of the story were false. He did not have a brother.
Quantrill laced the story with his real experiences among Jayhawkers giving the tale extreme
plausibility. The story fell on captive ears and catered to the notion of noble revenge that
many pr<Psouthem Missourians wanted to hear. Quantrill s tale paralleled themes of the
I

early literature that emerged from the period depicting Confederate Guenillas as noble
warriors seeking revenge. 62
This story was essential to Jonathan Edwards's treaTiise, Noted Guerrillas. KRowing
many Confederate gueIriilas himself, Edwards used his first hand knowledge and access to
surviving memories. to produce an account that is anything but historical in his 1'877 book.
Using flowery language and epic-like prose, Edwards paints Quantrill as the noble crusader
avenging the horrible kill'ing of his brother. The Confederate guerrillas are dashingly
romantic and flamboyantly noble. Instead of being a reliable historical! source, the book
adds to the folklore and legend surrounding the Confederate raiders, commenting 'On Ithe

sociological need for heroes in a society marred by violence, injustice and atrocities. With
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Quantrill finnly grounded on the Southern side after the Morgan Walker raid, the looming

Civil War found Quantrill,
Essentially just another boarder outlaw, only perhaps somewhat more vicious,
imaginative, and daring than the average ... a common case of a young man
whose ambitions outran his accomplishment; who desired wealth and success,
but who was impatient and impotent in their quest; and who came to resent his
failure and the world which caused it 63

"Bloody" Bill Anderson
William Anderson, Jr's., background and upbringing were typical for pioneer
families. His family continually pioneered West and Bill became a product of his pioneer
environment: a tough and an able horseman. Born in Kentucky in 1839, Bill Anderson's
father. William Sr., moved his family to Missouri in the mid 18505 and then to Kansas
during the spring of 1857 when Kansas was opened to settlers. Anderson Sr., and his
family homesteaded along the Santa Fe Trail and sold supplies to traveling settlers. 6" Hard
luck soon hit the Anderson family when Bill's mother was struck by lightning

ane killed in

1860. Bill's older brother Ellis Anderson fled to Iowa after he shot an Indian. The
surrounding social and political environment was volatile and marked with sectional tension
and violence. Living within these environmental factors, Bill Anderson experienced
hardship and loss. By the time the country plunged into the Civil War, Anderson had
already seen the death of his mother and the exile of his brother. Soon, his father was to
meet the same fate. Such hardships were not uncommon to pioneer families during the
1850s, though the death of both parents and exile of a brother seem particularly unJucky
and uncommon. The hardships of the frontier as well as its lack of a solidified law
presence characterized young Anderson's environment Bill worked as a rancher and
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accompanied wagon trains on the Santa Fe Trail. He experienced success working as a
skinner and rancher though his business practices soon came into question when Anderson
returned from trips to Missouri with horses that he would soon selllocally.6'
At the beginning of the Ci viI War, Anderson was 22 and the increasingly chaotic
environment afforded him the ability to expand his "horse business" into full-blown
banditry. Similar to the activity of Jayhawkers during the Bleeding Kansas struggle of

1856-1860, bands of Kansas Red Legs, loosely organized brigades of Unionist militia
under the command of Kansas Senator James H. Lane were recognized by the red leggings
they wore. These gangs operated under the ideological cloak of abolitionism to foray into
Westetp ~souri plundering and looting "secessionists." Anderson, while not
specifically identifying under the same ideological fig leaf of these Red Legs, participated in
the same raids of Western Missouri. It would certainly seem counter to his southern
upbringing and his KenOlcky birth that Anderson would steal and loot from people with
whom he shared similar political ideals and values. It was financial profit, however, that
seemed to motivate Anderson and eclipsed any commonality that he shared with pro
southern Missourians. Authors Albert Castel and Thomas Goodrich write that Anderson,
while trying unsuccessfully to recruit neighbor Charles Strieby to joinl his horse-stealing
forces, said, "I don't care any more than you for the South, Strieby, but there is a lot of
money in this [bushwhacking] business.'t66 Anderson's values changed as the Missouri
Kansas guerrilla conflict intensified during the Civil War. Early in the war, Anderson can
be described as living for profit under loosely formed Southern values with a lust for violent
adventure. After the death of his sister Josephine and the maiming of his sister Mary Ellen
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at the hands of Federal authorities, Anderson lived for retribution that he would enact in a

ruthless, bloody and enraged fashion.
At twenty three Anderson had experienced the death of both parents and used the
cover of regional politics to plunder to rob from Unionists in Missouri. His horse thievery
had led to violence and violence had led to murder. To what extent Anderson, now exiled to
Missouri, began to identify with the Southern cause is unclear. In the beginning of the war
seems Anderson's ideology was driven equally by greed and his loyalties to the South. By
the summer of 1863, Anderson could not kill enough Unionists after the death of a sister
and the maiming of another. It was a retributional, violent life that the young Anderson had
already experienced on the frontier. He had gotten ahead by robbing and slealing and
Anderson had not been punished for his actions. Anderson allowed his horsemanship
skills, skill with a gun, and his knowledge of the country to blend with the boldness required
to rustle horses and a lack of ethics to prevent it The chaotic environment of Kansas and
......

!~

Missouri allowed Anderson's actions to go largely unchecked. Anderson's fearless and
daring personality, shown by his actions throughout the war, fueled his continued
bushwhacking and soon earned him his nickname, Bloody Bill.
Little is known of Anderson's actions between his flight from Kansas and when he
first appears in the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies for leading an
attack on a German-Unionist settlement in Lafayette, Missouri, on July 15, 1863. While
Anderson had participated in guerrilla activities before the war, he too committed greater and
greater atrocities as the war went on. Castel and Goodrich report that Anderson belonged to

a gang of bushwhackers comprised mainly of young men from Kansas. It is believed that
Anderson rode under the notorious bushwhacker Dick Yager. Yager was described by the
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Council Grove Press as "one of the worst Guerrillas in MissOuri.'>67 On one foray into
Kansas, Anderson returned home to Council Grove to find the family farm reduced to
ashes. Anderson was probably not surprised. The act of burning suspected and known
southern farms was common in eastern Kansas. After leaving Council Grove, Dick Yager's
gang of bushwhackers was swprised by U.S. Marshal James McDowell's sixty-man

posse. Even though Yager and both Bill and Jim Anderson escaped, ten bushwhackers were
captured. The men were later shot while "attempting to escape.'>68 Since Anderson is the
only notorious Confederate Guerrilla of fighting age not to begin the war fighting under
Price he seems not to fit into the four stage guerrilla devolution. Closer examination of
Anderson's.Civil
War life shows that he did fit the four stages because his murderous
~
----:,.
streak grew while his respect for Confederate superiors decreased as the war progressed,
major themes of the four stages.

Jesse and Frank James
Jesse James had a short history before joining Bill Anderson and George Todd's
guerrilla outfit in the spring of 1864, after the Lawrence Massacre. The soon to be
notorious Confederate guerrilla turned outlaw was only sixteen. Described as icy cool and
lithe by those who rode with him, the yOlmg James would participate and experience the
most base and terrible times of Missouri's guerrilla warfare before embarking on his outlaw
career. A certain mystique and folk hero status surrounds the hard life of Jesse James. He
was championed by some as a noble Robin Hood like outlaw, driven to a life of crime by
radical Northerners. In reality, James' young life as a Confederate guerrilla was neither
noble nor similar to the legend of Robin Hood The time in which he lived and the
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surrounding environment were violent, chaotic and deeply divided along sectional lines.
Jesse James fought for the South and possessed Southern sympathieS as the son of
Kentucky farmers. He also plundered, murdered and bwned with a cool vengeance that was
created when James was young, growing up on a farm in Clay County, western Missouri.
Born of pioneer stock in Clay County, Missouri, on September 5, 1847, James was
the second son of Zerelda Cole and Robert James, both from Kentucky.69 Jesse's older
brother Franklin, born four years ahead of Jesse, would ride with Jesse throughout his
outlaw career. To explain Jesse and Frank's violent and murderous streak as the result of
being born to poor, abusive parents devoid of morals, is not possible. The James brothers'
parents were, "apparently better off intellectually, morally, and even financially than the
great masses rolling across the Mississippi."70 After serving the towns surrounding the
James's farm as a Baptist minister for the fIrst ten years of Jesse's life, Robert James
abruptly left for the California gold fields. Robert James died in California soon after he
~

arrived and Zerelda Cole remarried, soon separated and then married her third husband., Dr.
Ruben Samuel.
None of the scholarship on the Iameses mentions their homestead being a victim of
Jayhawking during the pre-war violence that engulfed Western Missouri and Eastern
Kansas. Frank James answered Confederate General Sterling Price's call for men and left
home to join the Clay County militia when Jesse was only thirteen. The James farm was
only a few miles away from a family farm that shared the name of their post-Civil War
gang-the Youngers. Furthermore, the James farm was less than a day's ride from another
famous Confederate guerrilla family turned outlaw-the Daltons. This proximity and sharing
of a common cause formed the support network that provided the guerrillas with
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intelligence, cover, and sustenance throughout the war and after. 71 It was Union efforts to
eradicate this support network that increased the severity of the conflict and infused
Confederate guerrillas with the need for violent revenge.
Growing up on the frontier undoubtedly produced young men that were rugged and
capable of enduring the hard riding life and wounds of a Confederate guerrilla and Western
outlaw. The Youngers and the Jameses were no exception. In fact. the first summer when
Jesse joined Anderson and Todd's band of guerrillas, he was severely wounded when a
bullet from a federal cavalry carbine passed through the left side of his chest on August 12,
1864. Jesse James recovered and the scar was still readily visible at the time of his death in
1882 ~d ~as used to positively identify the outlaw's body.72
The Confederate guerrillas all clung to stories, some true, some fabricated, of why
they held the Union in utter hatred. Quantrill fabricated a story that his older brother (he
was the oldest male of the family) was murdered by Kansas Jayhawkers before the war.
Bill Anderson's sister was killed while being held in a Federal jail that collapsed shonly
before the Lawrence massacre. Jesse James had ample reason to despise the Union. Each
biographer of James has given a slightly different account of an incident that occurred when
Frank had left to join the Confederate militia and just Jesse, Jesse's mother and stepfather

Dr. Samuel remained on the James farm. Unfortunately nothing in the Official Records of
the Union and Confederate Annies or local newspapers corroborates the story, though the
incident seems plausible enough. Author James Horan writes, ''there is nothing [0 support
[the story) but its repeated telling."n
Basically the story goes like this: A group of Union militiamen arrived at the James
farm determined to interrogate Zerelda Cole and Dr. Samuel as to the location of Quantrill.
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The fiery Cole, pregnant at the time, only berated the militia so they twned their anention to

Dr. Samuel. Despite the hysterical Cole, the militiamen looped a noose around the neck of
the aging doctor and repeatedly hung him from the coffee tree in their front yard. Young
Jesse, fifteen at the time, was caught while working in the fields and was chased, caught, and
repeatedly flogged with a rope. Zerelda Cole managed to cut her husband down from the
tree, yet the repeated hangings "resulted in permanent damage." "Jesse was enraged by

the events of the day. His hatred for his enemy intensified far beyond the ordinary
emotions of a teenage boy."?" Overlooking the stylistic surplus of the passage, a very
personalized hatred of the Union was undoubtedly formed within the young Jesse James as
a result of the incident.
James then tried to join Quantrill's band Frank, however, sent the fifteen year old
Jesse home. If this story is true and had Jesse stayed on with Quantrill's band, the youth
would have participated in the historic Lawrence Massacre, the largest atrocity committed by
~l

.~

the largest number of guerrillas ever assembled. The Lawrence Massacre represents an
important turning point during the Confederate guerrilla sbUggle. The murder and violence
established a new precedent on both sides. The Confederate guerrillas had sealed their
identity as unscrupulously fighting for their cause. The Union was under intense political
pressure to up the retaliation. While not trivializing the atrocities committed, on the part of
the guerrillas, the raid was a military feat of organization, travel and eluding Federal pursuit
Never again would such a large number of guerrillas unite. The following summer, the
guerrillas would continue to commit atrocities, yet their cause became confused and their
pwpose hazy. Many of the older guerrillas who started off as Confederate regulars under

General Price, would leave the bands after the Lawrence massacre due to lack of discipline.
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As a result of what they had become, dissension fw1her divided their numbers. Boys who

had grown up in the violence and chaos of Missouri and Kansas were attracted to the
guerrilla bands for adventure and began to replace the older men who had began fighting for
the Southem cause. Furthermore, it was i,ropossible for these young men to remain in
Jackson, Cass, Bates, amd Cl!ay,counties as male southern sympathizers. Jesse James was
one of those young men who joined the band of Bill Anderson and George Todd in the
spring of 1864. The band was, if not already, soon to become the most notorious and
bloody guemIlas after the Lawrence Massacre. Bill Anderson and George Todd welcomed
the young Jesse James into their band.

Cole Younger

Cole Younger is the best example of someone who was "driven to the bush,,,B or
forced 'to fight a guerrilla war, by ,the events that unfolded around him before the Civil War.
Cole Younger was born January 15.1844, in tass County, Missouri. Cole Younger hailed
from.an old "aristocratic" famiJy that had their fOOts in Virginia. Cole's father, Henry
Younger and his mother, Bursheba, were prosperouS pioneers and leading social citizens.
The Youngers owned as many as five different farms as well as a dry-goods store and a

livery. The YOIDlgers also were among the minority in Missouri who owned slaves. '6 The
Younger' 5 farm in Jackson county would become a repeated victim of Jayhawking as welJI
as the livery that Henry Younger kept to service his mail lUll.
As a result of an incident with a Union militiaman during the fall. of 1861, Cole had

placed himseLf in a dangerous position. Cole. along with. IDS brother Jim and two of their
sisters attended a dance thrown for Martha Mockbee, the daughter of a local affluent family
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also with Southern sympathies. During the evening, a militiaman named Irving Walley who
was stationed at Harrisonville asked one of the Younger siste~ to dance. The Younger
sister refused and Walley may have commented negatively on her character. Defending his
sister, Cole Younger ordered Walley to leave her alone. Walley then increased the tension
of the situation by asking Younger the location of Quantrill. Younger replied that he did not
know and Walley proceeded to accuse him of lying. Cole struck the militiaman and a fracas
between the two ensued. Although Walley reportedly drew a pistol on Cole, the other
young men at the party stopped the incident from esca1ating.77
Cole returned home and his father advised him to continue on to the Younger farm
in Jackson county. Henry Younger's advice to his son proved wise because that night
Walley traveled to the Younger farm and demanded H:enry Younger produce Cole on
grounds of him being a spy for Quantrill. As a resu1r of this incident tie eighteen-year-Qld
Younger used the circumstances to justify his actions. That winter Cole joined his brother
.

'I
I

in law John Janette and together the two joined Quantrill's band?8 When Cole j,oined

Jarrette, and bid his father farewell, the two would never speak. again. Henry Younger was
murdered on July 20, 1862 while returning home after a success full week of business. The
motivations for the murder seem to be political because his watch, wallet and money belt
containing over $1,000 doll~ remained uUact on his body.79 Before the war, Cole Younger
demonstrated the least amount of outlaw tendencies. Before the Walley incident, his father

urged him to attend college so as to stay ,out of the war. Due to his families' wealth, it is
likely that Cole would have gone on to be a successfu] business man like his father. In the
case of Quantrill and Anderson, who demonstrated their outlaw tendencies before the war,
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Cole is the opposite. His outlaw career began after the war and continue until he was
securily locked away in prison in Stillwater, Minnesota.
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Stage 1
The Be2i nn ing of the War: Enthusiasm and Integrity
Due to the uncertainty of Missouri's identity, the first stage of conventional war
between the Confederacy and Union would prove to be the shortest. After these furious
days of early May 1861, the men who would become Missouri's most notorious guerrillas
and post war outlaws were part of the established social fabric and institutions. William
Clarke Quantrill, served as a private under Sterling Price and his first taste of warfare came
at the same time as Frank James's and Coie Younger's and other soon to ,be notable
guerrillas like George Todd and William Gregg. Both men were under ,the command of
General Price at the first and largest, pitched banles in Missouri. Frank ]James, a member of

.

his Clay County militi~ was a private under Price because his wtit was called intQ.§eFVice.
'

Quantrill, who did not officially receive his Confederate Captainship until that next spring,
would serve as a private after the battle of Wilson's Creek on August 101b, 1,86].80 Jesse
James, fourteen at the time of the battle of Wilson's Creek, was home with his mother and
stepfather in Jackson County, Missouri, living an unremarkable life not yet touched by the
war. As events unfolded, however, James would go on to join Anderson and Todd in
numerous guerrilla raids.
Conflict in Missouri began as a result of thoughtful deliberation by the Slate
Legislature. The Missouri legislamre called a special session in Jefferson City after the
developments in St Louis. Even though this same legislature had no outright secessionist
members within its ranks, and had navigated a middle ground of compromise and
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Unionism, when Governor Jackson recounted the events of the Camp Jackson affair,
"resistance [to the secessionist cause] crumbled rapidly.'>81 Governor Jackson was given
dictator-like powers in order to "secure the safety of the state." The entire state treasury,
some $8.2 million dollars, was allotted for the purchase of war materials and an additional
$2 million was raised through loans and the issue of war bonds. s2
The Unionist elements centered in St. Louis were also acting fast to secure soldiers,
arms and munitions for the uncertain future of Missouri. Congressman Blair called upon
his brother, then Lincoln's postmaster general, to remove the moderate and slow-moving
Harney and promote Lyon to brigadier general.

Linco~

complied and soon Lyon

comm,anded
a force of 10,000. While Price was hard at work recruiting militia to fill his
t!
.......

ranks through secret orders that he issued to all of his division commanders, he issued
public statements to the effect that he hoped that Lyon would restore calm to St Louis and
not move beyond Missouri's largest city.s3 Lyon stayed in S1. Louis for the time being and
did not stop his efforts towards mustering troops within the borders of the state. Due to a
possible threat from Confederate troops marching from Arkansas, Lyon also had troops
from Iowa and Illinois standing by.
With Missouri poised on the brink of war between the 51. Louis-based Lyon and
Blair and the Secessionists Jackson and Price, the two sides sat down to one last meeting on
June 1 r b • Whatever their intentions, both sides found it worthwhile to at least meet to
discuss their differences. This relative civility would disappear as the war dragged on and
the troops devolved into guerrillas. Complete with their support staffs, Lyon met with Price
and Jackson in Jefferson City and at the conclusion of the conference, both men returned to
their lrOOpS to prepare for battle. While some -scholars say that Jackson and Price came in
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earnest, and it was the haughty and impetuous Lyon that dashed the hopes of a continued
truce, other scholars insist that neither side was interested in compromise but rather in
buying time to recruit, organize and train troops. It was Lyon that definitively ended the
moderates' hopes for neutrality. "Rather than concede to the state of Missouri for the
single instant the right to dictate to my Government ... I would see you, and you, and every
man, and every woman, and child in the state dead and buried,,84
After Lyon'-s return to 51. Louis, he moved his troops down river via feny to
Jefferson City in hopes of meeting Price's militia Price had retreated further down river to
Booneville. Lyon followed and after a brief skirmish near Booneville 00 June nth, Price
was. defeated and! retreated to the southwest comer of the state with Lyon following. Lyon
made camp in the town of Springfield while Price was camped near Wilson's Creek with an
army of 6,000. Price was met by Confederate General Ben McCulloch, a fonner Tex.as
Ranger, and between the two commands the Confederates numbered 12,000 men, many of
-~

them fresh recruits. as

.....

"

While Lyon was chasing Price, a politica[ development in the Union would prove to
hamstring Lyon in the battles to follow. Former Republican presidential candidate, hero of
California's bear flag revolt, and western explorer Iohn C. Fremont was appointed i(O
command the Union's Western department on Jwy 25. The challenges of Missouri's
chaotic political and social climate would prove too much for Fremont despite hi's politi~
and military background. In one of his fIrst mistakes, Fremont did not divert supplies and
soldiers to the extended Lyon, but instead chose to reinforce a Union garrison at Cairo,
illinois, in preparation for the 6000 Confederate troops marching from Western Tennessee
to New Madrid The threatening troops, however, did not attack.
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The inability to receive supplies did not stall or slow down Lyon's march, though he
was over 100 miles away from the nearest supply railhead at Rolla., Missouri. Even though
Price's troops were hastily assembled, and poorly armed., they outnumbered Lyon's two to
one. The aggressive and impetuous nerve that Lyon had demonstrated earlier would
continue to guide the events in southern Missouri. Instead of turning back, waiting for
reinforcements, or waiting for Price to make a move, Lyon boldly split his small army and
attacked Price's men in the early morning of August 10, 1861,along Wilson's creek.
Lyon's swprise attack achieved initial success. Many Confederates only had the
shotguns or squirrel guns that they carned from their fanns and some were caught drawing
water,from:Wilson's
creek in the early morning. A critical point in the battle came when
,,: ........
General Franz Sigel, Lyon's second in command and leader of the smaller part of the split
army, saw an approaching regiment dressed similarly to that of the fIrst Iowans. He ordered
his troops to hold their fIre. The approaching regiment was not from Iowa but rather
Louisiana and used the advantage of their unabated approach to rout Sigel's line with
unopposed fire. After suffering casualties due to the swprise, Sigel was driven from the
field in route to a Confederate victory. S6
The battle of Wilson's Creek was one of the "bloodiest and most memorable
battles of the early west. nS7 Both sides fought viciously and to the point of exhaustion.
The battle proved to be a Confederate victory, although Price failed to pursue the disoriented
and retreating Federal troops and perhaps cost the Confederacy control of Western and
Southern Missouri. General Lyon, whose ardent abolitionist beliefs influenced the early
course of the War in Missouri was killed when a ball struck him in the chest. Casualties on
both sides numbered over 1,200. 88
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In an attempt to restore order and reverse the direction of the Slate, Fremont took a
hard-line stance that further exacerbated the chaos in Missouri and removed him from
Lincoln's favor. On August 301h , Fremont placed the entire state under martial law,
something that General Haley had sought to avoid. Already a hot-button issue, property
and the issue of slaves determined the loyalties of many conditional Unionists in Missouri.
Fremont's edict furthered tensions on each side by twning the war in Missouri into a war
of the people. Men chiefly concerned about their slave property became secessionist
supporters because Fremont's order removed the chance for neutrality. The result would be
the burning of homes, the seizing of property and the further exacerbation of the already
deep-seeded conflict
Lincoln began to receive political pressure not only from Missouri but also from
Maryland, and threats of defection to the South were issued by Maryland if Fremont did not
rescind his orders. Lincoln privately encouraged Fremont to modify his order to be more
congruent to Congress's stance on secessionist property. Lincoln asked that Fremont
execute no Confederate irregulars without Washington's approval. Fremont rejected
Lincoln's prodding and Lincoln was forced to publicly order Fremont to modify his orders.
On the military side of things, the death of Lyon and the defeat at Wilson's Creek
made Fremont's first few weeks as commander of the Western Department of war a failure.
His problems would continue when Price reversed his course after Wilson's Creek and
headed north to Lexington, Missouri. Price's forces attacked the 3,500 man Union garrison
at Lexington on September 20th and through the ingenious use of water-soaked bales of
hemp as mobile trenches, he forced the garrison to surrender. Price's men would crawl
behind the large bales of hemp, three men butting the bales with their heads, slowly
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advancing towards the fort. Union shot could not penetrate the bails and incendiary fire
could not ignite the wet hemp. The garrison wasted much of its ammunition trying to repel
the rolling bales and soon Colonel James A. Mulligan had to surrender after a three-day
siege. In Jess than two months Fremont had lost over half of the state. The administrative
duties of supply requisitions, managing the rebel population, and the polar political

atmosphere of Missouri all proved too much for Fremont
Fremont felt that only militaIy victory could save him and he turned to the field in
hopes of engender support and boosting morale for the Unionists in Missouri through
military victory. While initially successful in driving Price to the border of Arkansas, he
was I11liey""eP of command during the final portion of his thrust and the more cautious
l·

_

General Henry Halleck took over the newly reorganized Department of Missouri. Halleck
now reported to General Ulysses S. Grant and it was Halleck who would oversee the
disposition of Confederate regulars from Missouri. Halleck appointed General Samuel R.
Curtis to command the Union army that was determined to see Price driven from Missouri.
Curtis did just that at the battle of Pea Ridge on March 7, 1862.
Though the Pea Ridge battle took place just over the Missouri border in Arkansas,
the Union victory ushered in control of the Mississippi in Missouri and marked the last
time non-guerrilla Confederate forces would fight for MissOuri. 89 From now on, the
Missourians who formerly fought for Price and continued to hold their Confederate
sympathies were on their own.
Thus far, this paper has sought to provide a framework in which to introduce its cast
of characters. Central to the understanding the lives of the Confederate guerrillas is the
environment that they were raised in and in which they lived. The paper has stressed that
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the Missouri-Kansas Civil War was a personal conflict where neighbor lashed out against_

neighbor, revenge bred murder and further revenge bred atrocity. In shon it was a war of
the people. The li ves of these fi ve Confederate guerrillas clearly illustrate how their war was
personal: being whipped by Union soldiers, having their family farm set ablaze by
Jayhawkers and finally, bearing the death and maiming of sisters held in Union custody.

During the war, all gained notoriety through their violent deeds. For the three that survived
the war, the surrender of the Confederacy in the spring of 1865 brought little closure to their
li ves as guerrillas.

Johnson 49

Stage 2
Rise of Guerrilla Action 1861-1862
Many of the men that would later take on infamous roles as Confederate guenillas

fought in the pitched battles of Wilson's Creek in August 10, 1861, and Pea Ridge,
Arkansas on March 7, 1862. At that point in the war, the men who would later become
guerdUas were in their first stage of development. The initial enthusiasm, confidence and
determination present on both sides of the struggle produced the clear military purposes of
meeting the opposing army and driving him from the field.. During the beginning stages of
the war, Kansas and Missouri experienced violence of two kinds. The first was the pitched
battleS:betffeen Union and Confederate forces, which, at the begimring of the second stage,
had come to an end The second kind was the violence that Border Ruffi,ans and
Jayhawkers committed that had a more ruthless and unofficial! charncter because it involved
civilians, both as petpetrators and victims. Doring the rise of Confederate guerriJ!la action in
Missouri, the gueni.llas fought for the Confederate cause and against Jayhawkers. Even
though the line was slight depending on the situation, boundaries still existed among the

early Confederate guerrillas as shown by Quantrill "accepting surrender, granting paroles
[and] trying to exchange prisoners."9'O
Although the Confederates in Missouri had lost their official support of the
Confederate army by the spring of 1862, after it had been driven from the state, they
maintained much of their honorable conduct and the.ir internal discipline. Quantrill, for

example, at this time was "accepting surrender, granting paroles [and] trying to exchange
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prisoners.'J91 Nevertheless, the violence perpetrated by Jayhawkers, now called Red Legs
was beginning to spread
One sowce of the escalation was when newly elected Senator James H Lane of
Kansas led a group of I,SOO Red Legs, former Jayhawke~ currently under Union auspices,
to

loot and bum the town of 05Ce:01~ Missouri, on September 20, 1861. Lane was by no

means new to the political arena of Kansas. He had been the vanguard of the JayhawJcers'
attempts to thwart Missourians with Southern sympathies throughout the late 18505.
Shortly after Kansas was admitted ,to the Union as a free state on January 29,1861, Lane
was elected senator and traveled to Washington, D.C. While at the Federal capital, he

secured the favor of President Lincoln by organizing Union defense of the capital. after Fon
Sumter was bombarded in early April 1861. Lincoln then appointed Lane Brigadier
General and gave him the authority to raise Federal troops in Kansas. Due to lhis past
activity as a leader of the Jayhawkers, Lane was already we1!l connec,ted! and .soon formed the
-

~,

.

3rd , 4lh , and Sib Kansas regiments, known as Red Legs. 92 Now that there was a virulent anti-

Southern figure, operating under the blessing of Lincoln, committing depredations against
Southern sympathizers or anybody unlucky enough to cross his path, the hatred along the
border would escalate.
In response to Confederate General Sterling Price's recent victory at Lexington,

Missouri, on September 20!.b, Lane became "infuriated.,,93 Determined to act against the
Confederate victories, Lane consolidated a force of 1,500 Red Legs from the three Kansas
Regiments and crossed the Missouri border. Lane's bands plundered and burned their way
to the town of Osceola, Missouri, approximately 45 miles from the state line. Here the Red
Legs savaged the town by looting from homes, and stores while robbing the bank.. Osceola
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was a principal port on the Osage River so many warehouses were filled with dry goods and
Lane and his men made an impressive haul. The courthouse was burnt to the ground and
12 civilians were killed dwing the raid For Confederate guenillas, the incident sealed
Lane' s fate as perhaps the most hated man in Kansas. In the spirit of previous violence
along the border, the gueniUas wouJld soon 'repay Lane less than two years later by
massacring the town of Lawrence, Kansas. Cole Younger recounts in his biography that
Lane was the principle (and only) reason for their visit 94 Survivors of the Lawrence
massacre recaMed Southern guerrillas shouting "remember Osceola" as they murdered and
pillaged the Kansas town a linIe less tJrlan two years Jater. 95

,. It was near the end of ,the Confederacy being driven from the state when two of the
.

~~

central characters of this paper met for the first time. Frank James met Cole Younger
during the winter of 1861-1862. A Confederate guenilla serving under Quantrill named
John Jarrett, who was Cole Younger's brother in law, brought Cole with him when Quantrill
called the bood together late in January 1861. 96 During the spriJlg of 1862 the guerrilla war
began in earnest, with bands of guerrillas with commissions from the Confederate Congress
under the Partisan Ranger Act of ApriJ1862, a bill that acknOWledged Uregujars like
Quantrill as part of the Confederate army, attacking supply lines, cutting telegraph wire and.
destroying bridges. Even before the passage of the Partisan RaJilger Act, "Confederate
generals in Missouril and Arkansas encouraged the early operations of William Quantrill
and other guerrilla leaders. ,,97
The core of QuantriU's band was, according to Connelley, fon:aed during the winter
of 1861-1862 with the help of Morgan Walker and his son Andrew. That winter,
Jayhawkers were reportedly robbing Jackson county citizens. Quantrill, along with Andrew
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Walker was one of 11 men who had been organized to tail the band of Jayhawkers. The
band followed the Jayhawkers to the farm of Strawder Stone where the house had been
robbed and Mrs. Stone was suffering from a head wound after being struck by a
Jayhawker's pistol. Quantrill's party continued and came to the neighboring Thompson
farm when the party charged the Jayhawkers, "killing the man who had struck Mrs. Stone
and wOWlding two others, both of whom died at Independence later. n98 As result of the
incident, Thompson and Stone were charged with murder by civil authorities in
Independence. Quantrill freed the men by swearing in an affidavit that he had done the
killing. Somehow, Quantrill was never arrested and Connelley writes, "Ithe soldier killed by
Quantrill was the first FeOeral soldier killed in Jackson County, Missouri in the Civil
War.,,99

Shortly after the Stone-Thompson affair, Qwmtrillattacked a group of Missowi

Militia who was passing through Independence. It is believed that this engagement was 'the

"first real contest" for Quantrill and his men. Among those present was

Geor~e Todd

--

and

two men accused of participating in a bank robbery eight months after the surrender of the
Confederacy. 100
However, as the war continued and the Missouri guerrillas increased the scope of
their depredations, the Confederate Congress questioned the advisabiliJty of their earLier
decision of sanctioning irregulars. No doubt influenced by the Lawrence massacre, the
Confederate Congress ordered that all partisan units merge with the regular uniformed anny
in January 1864. For the guerrillas of Missouri, this order was nothing more lthan a change
on paper: some guerrillas, like Quantrill, refused while others were hundreds of miles away
from regular Confederate companies. Quantrill and Anderson paid these orders little heed,
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and even had they tried to make any of their men obey during the winter of 1863-1864,
guerrilla captains had little control over their men-. 1ol

After the Union army had driven General Price from the state after the battle of Pea
Ridge in early March, 1862, bands of guerrillas began to ambush Union patrols and supply
trains as well as hitting military targets like telegraph wires, bridges and railroad tracks. The
fIrst mention of Quantrill functioning as a guerrilla in the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Annies is February 3, 1862. Captain William S. Oliver of the Seventh
Missouri Wantry writes, "I have seen this infamous scoundrel rob mails, steal coaches and
horses, and commit other similar outrages."I02 The description in Captain Olive's report
on

Qu.~tri..E·s

deeds committed early in 1862 is striking when compared to Lieutenant

L·

Colonel Charles W. Blair's report of the Baxter Springs Massacre of October 6, 1863:
"They killed our men as fast as they caught them, sparing none."I03
A critical time that raised the stakes and severity of the border war and also began
the transition from the second stage to the third stage was when the Confederate guerrilJas
were declared outlaws by the Union. On March 13, 1862, in response to the depredations
of Quantrill's band and other simi lar bands operating in Missouri, the commander of the
Department of the Missouri, Major General Henry W. Halleck ordered that Confederate
guenillas, if captured "will not be treated as ordinary prisoners of war, but will be hung as
robbers and murderers."I04 When Quantrill found out about Halleck's recent
proclamation, he was immediately cognizant about the ramifications. According to
Connelley, Quantrill read the order to his men "carefully explaining to them that they were
deprived of the benefits of civil and military laws, that from that day no quarter would be
given them."IOj The men who wished to leave were given pennission by Quantrill,
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Edwards writes that the noble Quantrill dramatically drew a line in the ground with his saber
telling all those that wished to continue should cross.
For the rest of the summer, Quantrill and his band, which had grown to over one
hundred men, raided and ambushed. In comparison to the following summers, guerrilla
activity could be considered mild The implicit rules of war that had governed the guerrillas
when they served under Price still largely governed their conduct. As the scope of
depredations along the border increased, the implicit rules of war would be lost. Their most
notable engagement was a raid on the Union garrison of Independence, Missouri in which
Quantrill's band teamed up with a Confederate colonel named Upton Hays who was in
northeast Missouri recruiting for the Confederacy. Quantrill was successful and the raid
increased his notoriety. That winter, Quantrill and his band scouted for 10 Shelby's
Missouri Brigade, a cavalry division under the command of General John S. Marmaduke
and Quantrill traveled to Richmond, Virginia. While in Richmond, Quantrill had hopes of
.~

obtaining a colonel's commission though it is believed that he never obtained it. The spring
of 1863 found Quantrill back in Jackson country Missouri with an even larger following.
During the summer of 1863, the border war was intensified, made more personal and the
guerrilla war began to model the attributes of stage three: the breakdown of the traditional
rules of war that historically protected civilians. Soon, the Missouri conflict would degrade
into bloody vengeful killing of civilian and soldiers alike.
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Stage Three
Descent into Blood, Events leading to Lawrence Massacre
During the late days of August 1863, the largest guerrilla band ever assembled in
Missouri, led by QWlI1nill, COIllIllltted pemaps the largest atrocity of the war. Bill Anderson,
Cole Younger, Frank James, George Todd and William Gregg were among the 400
guerriJllas that wreclred havoc on the Kansas town of Lawrence. The massacre of Lawrence
and i,ts surrounding events are key events in the history of the border war. The events
leading up to the massacre are emblematic of the 1'e vel of personal savageness the border
war had reached: guerrilla family members arrested and deported, captured guerrillas
executed.1iid the creation of death lists by the guerrillas. The level to which the struggle
escalated after the massacre truly made the war in Missouri and Kansas a war of the people
and seared. feel.ings and memories that would be largely responsible for the hostile
environment after the war. The divisions betWeen civilians and soldiers were breaking
down, as men like Quantrill brought the people of Missouri and Kansas into the conflict
during this third stage.

In the spring of 1863, Quantrill again was the bane of Union efforts to control
'Missouri and stop the violence in Kansas. The particular brand of ruthless guerrilla
violence that the people of Kansas and Missouri had created was escalating. The guerrillas
maintained discipline and had proven their attachment to the Confederacy that winter by
serving under General Joseph Shelby as scouts and cavalry. While Quantrill was in
Richmond attempting to increase his rank from Captain to Colonel, guerrillas George Todd
and William Gregg commanded Quantrill's band that winter. That winter, the Missouri
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guerrillas would see action in the battles of Cane Hill, Arkansas and a brief invasion of
Springfield, Missouri. 106 As spring approached, Missouri guerrillas broke off Shelby's
brigade and began to filter back to Missowi The fact that the guerrillas had served under
regular commands showed that they still believed in the Confederate cause. Granted., the
guerrillas did not stay through the winter and some, in the case of Cole Younger, left early to
care for other wounded guerrillas. The imponant distinction that illustrates the difference
between stages three and four is that the following winter Missouri guerrillas would largely
ignore Confederate orders.
Events that unfolded that spring, the hanging of noted guerrilla Jim Vaughn and the
collapse of a federa] prison in Kansas City that killed five female family members of
Confederate guerrillas, were immediate causes of Quantrill's massacre of Lawrence,

Kansas. In addition, Kansas Senator Jim Lane, leader of the Red Legs and the Osceola raid
made Lawrence his 'Stronghold He was also in r.he process of completing a large new home
.

~

::

that he had built largely from spoils taken from Missouri.
Early that summer, Quantrill had attempted to arrange a prisoner exchange. Union
authorities refused to deal with Quantrill because he was viewed as a criminal and one of his
men, Jim Vaughn, was sent to the gallows. The hanging of Vaughn was not distinctive;
many guerrillas were executed after capture, though his story is representative of the
retaliatory nature of the conflict Among his fellow guerrillas, Jim Vaughn was a brave and
"well liked bus'hwhacker" who rode wi:th Quantrill. I07 Attracted to the town of Wyandotte,
Kansas, for a haircut and shave, Vaughn donned Union blues as a ,disguise and traveled to
town in the early summer of 1863. John McCorkle, a scout who also rode with Quantrill,

recounted to biographer O.S. Barton that Vaughn was going to visit a girl who was "sweet
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on him."I08 This story, however, does not correlate with any other treatments in the
secondary literature, so it is likely that it is an embellishment striving to serve the romantic
appeal of many Confederate sources that were produced by guerrillas after the war. In any
event. Vaughn was recognized and he was reported to authorities. He was captured while
reclining in a barber chair by Federal troops. Upon hearing the news of Vaughn's arrest.
Quantrill offered to exchange three captured Union troops, including an officer, for the
return of Vaughn.109
Brigadier General James Blunt refused this negotiation and Vaughn was given to the
hangman sometime during the end of July. McCorkle gives a romantic knightly account of
the eX.eeution
-.
... ...... of Vaughn that also illustrates the chivalric-like honor code that was
popularized in Confederate guerrilla biographies after the war. The captured Union officer
speaks to Quantrill after he learns that Blunt has rejected Quantrill's offer to exchange
Vaughn for him.
Colonel, I know you intend to execute me and my two companions and. after
knowing you have tried to save us, I do not blame you, but I have a
proposition to make to you: if you will let me, I will go to Kansas City and
see the authorities and, I believe, that being a lieutenant in the regular army, I
may be able to prevail upon them to accept yoW" proposition. I will return,
whatever may be their decision. Quantrill looked at him a moment and said.
I trust you; go. On an afternoon of the third day, the lieutenant rode into our
camp and walking straight up to our colonel (Quantrill) said, I have failed; I
gave vou my word, and I have returned to be executed, and I am prepared to
die. lill

Quantrill, according to McCorkle's story, was impressed with the man's bravery
and set the three Union soldiers free on the condition that they resign their commissions
and not take up arms against the South. McCorkle recounts, "the three federal soldiers,
with tears in their eyes, thanked Quantrill, mounted and left to go home."111 Jim Vaughn
was hanged the next day and these were his last words, 'We can be killed by we cannot be
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conquered. Taking my life today will cost you one hundred lives, and this debt my friends
will be paid in a very short time.,,112 Quannill and his raiders would soon prove true to
their friend's word through violence and killing mat were not swpassed by a single incident
during the entire Kansas and Missouri guerrilla war.
Although revenge for Vaughn's hanging was also a contributing factor, lthe most
influential immediate cause for the sack of Lawrence, and the further escalation of the

border war, was when captured Confederate guenilla family members were kiJlled when a
Federal prison in Kansas City collapsed The capUlring of soldiers' families was illegal
during the Civil War. The Union, however, did not cOQsider Missouri guenilJas soldiers,
and as a result, their families, believed to clandestinely support their eff~rts, were arrested
and deported beginning in 1862. 113 The strategic effect of the policy was hard to judge yet
the effect on Confederate guerrillas was pronounced. This treatment of women violated the
Victorian code, of the guerrillas. While women had been wounded as a result of the
~

'I

guerrillas' violence, Quantrill and his men expressly souL¥tt to avoid their physical harm if
only out of fear of the Jayhawkers' reprisa!l. Confederate guenil1a George Todd sent a
letter to Brigadier General Thomas Ewing deIrulllding that captured women be released or
else he would burn Kansas City to the groWld Major General lohn Schofield commented
on what the border war had become, "it is the old border hatred intensified by the rebellion
and by the murders, robberies, and arson which have characterized the iuegular warfare
carried on here during the early periods of the rebellion, not only by the rebels, but by our

own troops and people." I 14
Since the Missouri guerrillas were so elusive, frustration was rising on the part of
Union commanders and fear was growing among civilians. Many of the men had grown up
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in Western Missouri, like the James brothers and Cole Younger, and knew the country well.
The fact that the men were adept horseman and lived off the land gave them flexible latitudes

in which to travel and operate. The Confederate government could not supply the guerrillas,
and as a result they foraged the land and received food and shelter from local secessionists.

Indeed, General Ewing, as a reaction to the Lawrence Massacre. increased the depopulation
of people living in Western Missowi counties and even "destroy[ed] all forage and
subsistence therein" I IS Even before then,. the families of known guerrillas were arrested
and exiled in July of 1863. Many of Quantrill's men attempted to hide their families, and
Southem sympathizing men who had not yet taken to arms as guerrillas ended up joining
ConfePerate gueniUa ranks to avoid capture, further increasing the number of Confederate
\-:'

'~

guerrillas.
Despite the t!hrea:ts from these men who carried barbaric, fear-instilling reputations,
the captured women that included Cole Younger's cousin and Bill Anderson's two sisters,
remained securely locked in a prison inl Kansas City. What would happen next would sear
the temperaments of Confederate guerril!las and cause their ensuing quest for revenge to
outstrip their purposes as men fighting for the Confederate cause. Accounts of why the
prison collapsed and killed 6ve women and wounded three· are varied. Charity McCorkle
Carr, the sister of John McCorkle and the cousin of Cole Younger~ died in the collapse.
McCorkle charges that the Federnl soldiers had intentionally, "removed a large section of
the foundation wall ... [and then when] the building did not fall the first day more of the
wall was removed" The prison collapsed and as McCorkle noted, "Janie Anderson, who
was the youngest. tried to escape through a window, but the twelve pound ball that had been
chained to her ankle held her back." "Josephine Anderson," he continued, "could be
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heard calling for someone to take the bricks off her head Finally her cries ceased" 116
Clearly, McCorkle was not present at the prison, yet the tone of the details, assumedly
shared among his fellow guenillas, illustrated their perception of their enemy and galvanized
their pact of vengeance.

In his notes to McCorkle's biography, author O.S. Barton remarks that "Union
troops did not deliberately undennine it, but the Federal authorities were guilty of gross
negligence in keeping the women there after being warned that it was unsafe."ll7
Regardless of what the facts were, the response was the guenillas' retribution for past
injustices and a personal hatred that revolved around houses and families. Female family
members dying while in Federal custody raised the stakes of the already bloody conflict
Plans were beginning to form that would earn Quantrill the title, "the bloodiest man in
American history.""8

-,

On Friday, August 21, 1863, after nearly a continuous two-day ride, QuaI:Itrillled
approximately 400 men into the town of Lawrence, Kansas, where Senator Lane lay
sleeping in the abolitionist stronghold Three hours later, these guerrillas would leave the
town pillaged and in flames and would have murdered 183 rnen. 119 It was Quantrill's
boldest, bloodiest and most egregious raid yet, and would prove to be the largest massacre
of the Missouri-Kansas struggle. The morning of the raid was clear and calm. Quantrill's
men tightened the cinches on their saddles, drew their revolvers and some even "stuck
leather reins in their mouths and bit down hard, leaving both hands free" so as to be able to
use both hands to fire the guenilla weapon of choice, the revolver. 120 At five past five
Quantrill's men galloped into Lawrence, fanned out across the city, and began shooting and
setting fIre to houses. The raiding guerrillas were not completely indiscriminate in their
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killings, according to author Goodrich, "from out of shin pockets came the lists with long
rows of names ... The Missourians had finally gotten amon.g those they hated most. nUl
The names on the !lists included ~eading citizens andi political figures, Mayor George
Washington Collamore, Senator Jim Lane and other prominent citizens such as state senator
Simeon Thorpe and] newspaper editoli' Joseph Trask. AU these men were rounded up. their
wealthy homes set ablaze, and shot, many still in their nightshirts. The band continue to loot
and pillage; two bank safes were blown open and an estimated $25,000 of currency was·
stoleD'.12.2
Despite the viciousness of the raid, a citizen of Lawrence marveled at the
horse~ans~
4.'

and marksman ability of the guenillas. This passage illustrates tthe

•

guerrillas' formidableness as an enemy and also depicts the mystique of their ferocious
reputation.
The horsemanship of the guerrdlas was perfect. They rode with that ease .and
abandon which are acquired only by a life spent in the saddle amid desperate
scenes. Their horses scarcely seemed to touch the ground, and the riders sat
upon them with bodies erect amd anns perfectly free with revolvers at full
cock, shoutinfi at every house and man they passed, and yelling like demons at
every bound 3

Despite the heavy damage that the Confederate guerrillas achieved, especially to tthe

emotions of Kansas

free~soi1ers,

the raiders were unable to find and killithe first name on

their death list. The kader of tthe Red Legs and organizer of the Osceola raid, Senator
Lane, escaped Lawrence. Upon hearing the oogimililg gunshots of the raid, Lane tore into
the cornfield that abutted his house and continued to flee in his nightshirt UJiltil he was able
to make it to a nearby farm. Lane then took a plow horse and rode it barebacked to a
neighboring Union garrison in Olathe, Kansas to warn neighbors and surrounding towns.
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Reaction to Lawrence
Quantrill's raid on Lawrence, Kansas, was met with cries of outrage and! promises.
of vengeance from the town's surviving. inhabitants. Also as a I'€sult of the Lawrence
massacre, Major General John M. Schofield of the Union Army, Who was the commander
of the Department of lhe Missouri, and Brigadier General Thom.a.s Ewing, Jr., commander
of the District of the Border, were foICed into an increasingly difficult position. Both men
were prodded to accept resolutions that pemtitted a Kansas milit!i'a, assembled from seven
towns along the border and from Lawrence, to meet m Olathe, Kansas; with fifteen days
worth of supplies, to venture into Western Missouri

morder to "recover stolen ,property," a

clear justification for further Jayhawking. l24 The two generals had to assuage the anger of
Kansas while not allowing non-military forces to engage in further indiscriminate killing as

now practiced by Quantrill tllat had escalated since the summer of 1861--a difficult
position to be sure.

-,,

~

In a report to General Schofield dated August 24, 1863, the day after the Lawrence
Massacre. Thomas Carney, the Goverrior of Kansas begins: "disaster has again fallen on

our state." His frustration and anger are clear in his letter. The governor b1ames Missouri
and accuses Western Missouri of "knowing everything about it [the raid]:." The root of
the problem, believes Carney, is tbe guerrilla sympathizers that live along Missouri's
Western border. 'There is no way of reaching these armed mffians while the civilian is
permined to cloak him." He contiIlues, 'There can be no peace in Missouri, there· will be
desolation in Kansas, unless both are made Ito feei prompt:ly the rigor of military [aw.,,125
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Governor Carney implores Schofield to act upon his recommendations and also
includes an order for anns, horses and supplies for three militia regiments. General
Schofield replies to Governor Carney's request with "3,000 stand of arms" but is clear that
their purpose only is to "ann the militia of the towns." General Schofield makes no
suggestion of taking Kansas lvfilitia into Missouri. The importance of militia, according to
Schofield is to protect towns because, "Quantrill, in the summer season, is simply
impossible with out five times my present force," Schofield closes his letter by promising
justice for those who have been wronged, and urges Carney to assist in "preventing the
recurrence of any calamity like that which befell Lawrence." General Schofield is also clear
in his 9bjection to a militia-led foray into Missouri to recover stolen property. If the
",f

....-.

recovery of stolen propeny were the only purpose of the expedition, then the General claims
support. He cautions, however, "it is a simple matter of course that the action of such an
irresponsible organization of enraged citizens would be an indiscriminate retaliation upon
innocent and guilty alike. You cannot expect me to pennit anything of the sort.

II

126

Criticisms fell on Ewing for failing to protect the border and Lawrence. In his
report of the incident, the General blamed poor intelligence and his subordinates. Earlier
that summer, Ewing, having heard rumors that Quantrill was planning to sack Lawrence,
stationed a garrison in the town for a fortnight in July, but no auaek came. He moved the
troops to locations closer to the border where they were needed. Ewing was sensitive to
criticisms from the northern Press because Quantrill had eluded him since 1861. In his
report he blamed Captain lA. Pike, who had received intelligence that Qilllflbill had crossed
the Kansas border on the 19lh of August, for not engaging in pursuit but merely relaying
information to Ewing. "By Captain Pike's error of judgement in failing to follow promptly
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and closely, the surest means of arresting the terrible blow was thrown away, for Quantrill
would never have gone as far as Lawrence, or anacked it, with 100 men close on his rear."
Ewing also cites as a reason for his troops' inability to stop the guerrilla that, "Quantrill
had his men mounted on the best horses of the border, and had collected fresh ones going
to and at Lawrence, almost enough to remount his command" 127 Conversely, Federal
soldiex:s were riding ,exhausted horses, which had ''marched 65 miles without rest."
Quantrill. accon:li.ng to Ewing, had notonly the advantage of fresh horses, but also
employed crafty riding techniques to ,elude Federal troops: "he broke trail. turned sharp Ito
the north, and dodged and bewildered the forces waiting for his-as well as those in

pursuit."IZB
Ewing also blamed Pike for not sending a scout to warn the people of Lawrence.
One effort 10 warn the townspeople a1so met with poor luck when a civilian rider, racing to
warn the town the day of the massacre, was thrown from his horse after it tripped. As a
~,

result from the accident, both the horse and rider died As was the case In such border
lowns of Olathe and Paola, many border towns were near military outposts or had garrisons
and militia on alert is case of guerrilla attack.. Lawrence, however, was not one of them. The
hubris of the citizens of Lawrence, a full day's ride from the border, was responsible for the
surprise Quantrill achieved The townspeople believed Lawrence too large and strong to
possibly be a target for guerrilla attack.
John Edwards, author of Noted Guerrillas, 1877, the first history of the guerrilla
warfare on the border contests that, "s full company of soldiers were stationed at Oxford,

Kansas, but they seemed more anxious to keep out of harm's way than to protect the
citizens."129 The reasons for Quantrill's success can be attributed to strategic Federal
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errors, Lawrence's lack of preparation, the military skill and endurance of Quantrill's
raiders, and the psychological effect of the gueniHas' reputation that produced caution on
the part of Federal forces. Federal excuses about losi'ng the trail of Quantrill seem less
plausible given the size of his band: 400 mOWlted men with some even riding with two
horses.
Just as the raid of Osceola caused a heighteJled reprisal by the guerrillas, General
Ewing escalated the savageness on the border by issuing his controversial! ~1lI general order

in an attempt to stamp out the guerril'las. It was an order that General Schofield opposed
because he foresaw the problems, in enforcing it. Schofield described his decision: "On the

2Smin~~tJissued
an order requiring all residents of the counties of Jackson, Cass, Bates,
l~

and ,the part of Vernon included in this district ... to remove from ,their present place of
residence, within fifteen days of that date, to any military station in it, or any part of Kansas.
west of the border COWIties."13O The order operated under the understandlng that anybody
who remained in the Missowi counties of Jackson, Cass, Bates, and the part of Vernon
counties were sympathizers with the guerrillas or fearfully neutral because those loyal to the
Union had already absconded. Ewing knew full well that those still in residence were
unlikely to move into military bases. Furthermore, Ewing stated that ''to obtain the full!
military advantages of this removal of the people, I have ordered the destrUction of all grain
and hay." With this order, Ewing hoped to accomplish two goals centrall to defeating the
guerrillas: taking away their sources of supply and! intelligence while permitting the military
to further depopulate western Missowi. Ewing was cognizant of the ramifications of his

aggressi ve orders, noting that "the execution of these orders will possibly lead to a still
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fiercer and more active struggle, ... but will soon result.. though with much unmerited loss
and suffering, in putting an end to this savage border war. ,,131
General Ewing was right, and the events of Lawrence proved that the Confederate
guerrillas were now firmly entrenched in the third stage of their development The guerrillas
were not protected by the rules of war and nor did they apply to their victims. Bill
Anderson most strongly embodied the traits of stage three because he fought chiefly to
avenge his sister's death. Connelley and Edwards report Ithat Anderson killed at ~east
fourteen men during the Lawrence massacre, the most of any guerrilla. He ,rode mto the,
town that morning, sobbing his sister's names. In Goodrich's account of the Lawrence
massacre, near the end of the killing, he reportedly told a Lawrence woman, ''I am here for
revenge and I have got it. nlH Even though it was early September when the last of the
guerrillas reached the safety of the Sni-A-Bar Creek thic.kets in Jackson County, Missouri,
the killing of the summer was not over. While traveling to winter in Texas, Quantril1l's band
~

,1

would meet Union troops at Baxter Springs, Kansas and the ensuing slaughter paraJlleled
the precedent established earlier in Lawrence.

Baxter Springs
Another example of Quantrill abandoning the established conventions of warfare
occurred in Baxter Springs, Kansas. It was a little over a month after the Lawrence
massacre when Quantrill led many of the same 400 men through the southeast comer of
Kansas on their way to winter in Texas. 133 The guerrilla leader and his sergeants had no
plans for another large-scale attack, though circumstances would allow otherwise. Major
General James G. Blunt, a native of Maine and current commander of the District of the
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Frontier was moving his headquarters of several wagons under the protection of a lOQ-man
cavalry. The convoy .was approaching a small Union garrison at Baxter Springs, Kansas.
that Quantrill's lead scouting ann, led by guerrilla Dave Poole, had already attacked The
approaching wagon train and cavalry of General Blunt probably did not recognize the
guerrillas because they were garbed in captured Union jackets. The compounded bad luck
of Blunt meeting the traveling guenillas and failing to recognize the deadly band may not
have made a difference because Blunts' cavalry were new recruits and poorly armed.
Blunt's escort proved no match for the well-armed hard-bitten guerrillas and their fast
horses. Quantrill's main unit bore down on the cavalry and they scattered in complete
confu~jon~lunt and

about 30 others were able to escape though the guerrillas claimed 89

lives and captured all nine wagonS.1.l4 Many of the Union soldiers, when found later by
patrols, were shot in the head from close range and nearly Jaying on top of one another,
evidence that they were executed after surrendering.
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Stage Four
Loss of Internal Discipline. and Purpose, Increase in
Banditry and Murder
The carnage that Missouri had experienced dwing the late summer and early fall of
1863 severely outstripped all violence that had occurred along the Kansas-Missouri border,
and showed how the guerrillas had stopped distinguishing between civilian and military
targets. The Union response to the Lawrence massacre: General Order # 11 would prove
devastating to the civilian population of Western Missouri. Quantrill and his men continued
to travel towards Texas and finally set up a winter camp on Mineral Creek., 15 miles

northwest of the town of Shennan. The winter would be the last time Quantrill would be
recognized as the chieftain of Missouri guerrillas, as finally their internal discipline started
to erode in the fourth and final stage of their devolution from Confederate soldiers,
sympathizers and irregulars into bandits. That winter and early spring, QuantritI"\ ~d
terrorized the town of Sherman, drank, gambled and raced horses. As a result of the
butchery at Lawrence and Baxter Springs, many of the older guerrillas that had joined the
band in 1862 after the battle of Pea Ridge were becoming disenchanted by the conduct and
direction of the guerrillas in the beginnings of their internal rifts. While the guerrillas
behaved loutishly, Confederate Generals and politicians back east began to debate their
worth.

However, as the war continued and the Missouri guerrillas increased the scope of
their depredations, the Confederate Congress questioned the advisability of their earlier
decision of sanctioning irregulars. No doubt influenced by the Lawrence massacre, the

Johnson 69

Confederate Congress ordered that all partisan units merge with the regular uniformed army
in January 1864. For the guerrillas of Missouri, this order was nothing more than a change
on paper. some guenillas, like Quannill, refused while others were hundreds of miles away
from regular Confederate companies. Quantrill and Anderson paid these orders little heed,
and even had they tried to make any of their men obey dwing the winter of 1863-1864,
guerrilla captains had little control over their men. 1JS
General 1. Bankhead Magruder, commander of the district of Texas, Brigadier
General Henry E. McCulloch, brother of Ben McCulloch who had died at Pea Ridge, and
General Edmund Kirby Smith exchanged letters discussing the worth and future of the
guerriyas.J.t this point during the war, Confederate manpower, among other things, was
dwindling and many Confederate officers, including Sterling Price who once encouraged
Missouri guerrillas, wanted the guerrillas to join the regular Confederate army. The
Missouri guerrillas had grown used to the easy discipline and chance for plunder and
refused. Officially, though, the guerrillas cited that if caprured their fate would be different
that other Confederate soldiers since the Union had branded them criminals. Through
operating in their previous capacity as guerriI!las, they believed they could slip away should a
regular army have to surrender. Even though Price wanted the guerriUas Ito join regular
Confederate ranks, he admitted to seeing their reasoning. 136
Added to the rude and wild conduct of the guerriUas and a general mcrease of their
shenanigans, robberies and murders of those they had previously been allied with began to
surface. While in Missouri, the guerrillas had only robbed Unionists and event defended
Southern sympathizers. Currently. the guerrillas were now doing to Southerners what they
had once only done to Unionists. Specifically, a Confederate Major named Butts was
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fOlmd dead with his watch and wallet missing. Later, another guerrilla informed Quannill
that it was a member of his own band named Fletch Taylor. Previously in the war, it seems
unlikely that Quantrill's men would have dared such a thing-especially when they were a
sanctioned part of the Confederacy. As a result of the incident and other similar incidents,
the frustrated and irate General McCulloch ordered Quantrill to "proceed as rapidly as
possible to the headquarters of Major General Magruder where you will immediately be
placed in the face of the enemy."137 Quantrill ignored the order. Again, though Quantrill
had operated largely independently from the Confederate Army, this was the first time he
ignored a direct order. Guerrillas from Missouri had joined Confederate regulars during
the previous winter. In response to the robbing and murder of Confederate officers,
Quantrill allegedly gathered his band of guerrillas together and issued a warning to cease
the alleged robberies and murder of Confederate men.
According to a letter from W.L. Potter to W.W. Scott dated February 29). 1896,
-,
:,

Quantrill said, "if there was any Man or Men ... that did not like his style of command,
they could take their horse and weapons and they were welcome to leave. Jlm "Bloody"
Bill Anderson took him up on his offer. Anderson, then third in command behind Quantrill
and George Todd, left the camp at Mineral Springs early in the spring of 1864 along with
20 of his men after exclaiming that he would having nothing to do with "any such a
damned outfit.',139 This dissention cemented the fourth and final stage. Even though
military discipline had previously been slight among Confederate guerrillas, the desertion of

Anderson shows that it now had disappeared. Again, through almost three year of terrible
fighting, this was the first major incident of upheaval between guerrilla leaders.
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Anderson and his men rode to General McCulloch's headquarters in Bonham,
Texas, and accused Quantrill of ordering the robberies of Confederates, conduct that was
markedly bitter and disloyal on the part of Anderson, perhaps as a result of when Quantrill
had paroled captured Union soldiers earlier in the war---something that Anderson had rarely
done. McCulloch sent for Quantrill and he traveled to Bonham along with 60 of his men.
McCulloch placed Quannill under arrest but he managed to escape. Quantrill and his 60
man compliment left Bonham in a hurry. McCulloch enlisted Anderson and a group of
Texas militia to capture Quantrill. Clearly Anderson felt no ties to Quantrill and waqs now
functioning as an independent renegade. The band lead by Anderson hounded Quantrill's
group .<fIld~.}'en exchanged a few shots, though no guerrillas were killed or injured. The
(,

.

secondary literature that deals with this episode said that neither group of guerrillas were

that intent on inflicting casualties on the other. It is likely that during this frrst instance of
COnfederate gueniUa fighting Confederate guerrilla each side was acutely aware of the
others' capabilities as Cavalry men at dose range with pistols. The bands hall'-heartedly
exch.anged shots over long range but the rift between the Anderson led band and the
QuantriU-Todd led band could not bave been that deep because Anderson and Todd would
join again during the summer of 1864. Nevertheless, Confederate guerrill.as were now
fighting Confedera1eguerriUas and from this point forward. no force numbering Quantrill's
band of 400-strong Lawrence raiders wouJld ever be assembled again.
Than April of 1864, Quantril1l and Todd led their band of guerrillas back into
Missouri. The trip was grueling in the spring mud and once in central Missouri Quantrill
disbanded the guerrillas so that smaller groups could forage for food., horses and
ammunition. After a rendezvous in Lafayette County in central Missouri, Quantrill and
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Todd had a falling out due to a "conflict that had been building for a long time."J40
According to Connelley, Todd and Quantrill were playing cards and Todd was cheating.
Quantrill accused his second in command and it was ~odd who drew his pistol first, thus
backing the guerrilla leader down. After the incideot, Quantrill saddled up and left with ten
of his most loyal followers. After Todd deposed Quantrill, little is known how he spent the
summer of 1864. While Anderson and Todd were busy raiding and committing some of
the worst depredations since the Lawrence massacre, Quantrill was either home visiting
friends and relatives in Canal Dover, living with his mistress Kate King in Howard County
Missouri, or traveling with Sterling Price as he made another feeble invasion of Missouri in
September of 1864. 141 After being usurped in front afhis men by Todd, Quantrill had lost
influence over his band because by this polin in the war, no military hierarchy governed the
guerrillas, they resembled a pack of wolves and Todd and Anderson were now the new
Alpha wolves.

;;?

Bill Andel'SQo, George Todd and the Ceotralia Massacre

The spring of 1864. brought more bl;JShwhacking to Missouri, though the landscape
was vastly different tba_fl the preceding spring. The border counties of Clay, Jackson and
Cass were largely depopulated due to Ewing's Order No. 11. Many of the southern
sympathizers, including many guemllas, had taken residence in Central Missouri while
continuing to rob and plunder. Steamboats became a favorite Itarget and soon ,companies
were offering steamboat captains $1,000 dollars for successful navi'gation from St. Louis to
Leavenworth. Indeed, the summer of 1864 was Missouri's "worst summer of
bushwhacking."

142

Localized around Chariton and Carroll counties, known to be the most
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Unionist counties, Bill Anderson was rapidly declining towards the savage dementia that
would characterize him lDltil his death. Anderson responded to a Lexington, Missouri,
newspaper editorial that had encouraged Union citizens to arm themselves.
Listen to me, fellow citizens ... do not take up arms if you value your lives
and property. It is not in my power to save your lives if you do. If you
proclaim to be in arms against the guerrillas I will kill you. I will hunt you
down like wolves and murder you. You cannot escape. It will not be federals
after }:'ou. Your arms will be no protection to you ... I will kill you for being
fools. J43

Since leaving Quantrill after terrorizing Confederate controlled Sherman, Texas,
Anderson had completed his step into the fowth stage of his guerrilla life: no longer was
Anderson part of a larger arm of guerrillas engaged in a war effort. He and George Todd
' ....
were riow 150ting and pillaging, concerned with nothing above plunder and killing for

revenge. Citizens began to meld with Union soldiers and Anderson began-to kill more of
both, Anderson was consumed by his obsession with revenge for the death and maiming
of his sisters, and he had lost his grounding in his Confederate roots, and was now fighting
from an amorphous cause of confused beliefs and embittered emotions.
Anderson's worst atrocity rivaled what he and other guerrillas had done in
Lawrence that previous year. After Anderson's and Todd's guerrillas sustained heavy
losses from their anack on a Union garrison in Fayette, Missouri, on September 24,
Anderson moved his band to the town of Centralia, Missouri. Confederate General
Sterling Price, who had led an army into Missouri hoping to incite an uprising among the
southern sympathizers in the state, was soundly defeated that day after trying to capture
Fort Davidson. Held by General Ewing, Fort-Davidson was 130 miles to the southwest of
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Fayette. l44 Anderson and Todd were attempting to ascertain Price's location and hoping to
rendezvous with his now ragged anny.
While in Centralia, Anderson's men sacked the town and robbed the 11:00 o'clock
stage. While robbing the stage, the men were distracted when a train out of St. Louis and
bound for St Joseph approached Centralia. The guerrillas constructed a barricade across
the tracks and stopped the train with a barrage of pistol fire. The passengers on the train
were all robbed except for a ill-fated group of furloughed soldiers who were returning
home after serving under Sherman in the Atlanta campaign. The 23 unanned men were
stripped of their uniforms and executed Anderson set the cars on fire and sent the empty
locomotive speeding out of Centralia. The bloodshed of the day, however, was not over.
The 39tb Missouri Infantry Volunteers under the command of Major A.V.E
Johnson had been tracking Anderson's band for over a day. The 100 men Johnson
commanded were poorly mounted, poorly armed and inexperienced Despite being ~arned
;·1

by the towns' people, Johnson was determined to attack Anderson's and Todd's guerrillas
who were now camped a few miles from Centralia Anderson and Todd were warned by
their scouts of the approaching Federal patrol. The guerrillas mounted and Major Johnson.
seeking to secure the advantage by using the range of his troops' rifles, dismounted his
men and formed a firing line. Anderson divided his men into three groups and charged
each flank and the center of Johnson's line. Frank James, while charging in the middle
column, was spattered with blood and brains when the charging guerrilla on either side of
him was killed. One of the men was a friend Frank Shepard, a man that Frank James had

met while in Texas.
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The v<?lley from the lOO-man Federal line did little damage to the guerrillas and few
Union soldiers had time to reload their muzzle-loading weapons. Major Johnson's men
were slaughtered. Those trying to escape on horseback were easily c,aught by the swift
horses of the guerrillas. All Union officers were scalped; some men were pinned to the
ground with their own bayonets. Jesse James, along with Frank was present at Centralia
Frank James claimed in an interview given to the Missouri Herald in 1897 that he remained
with Todd in camp dwing the initial slaughter of the furloughed troops and was busy
chasing fleeing Union troops so as not to be around during the scalping, mutilating and in

one case castration of Union troops, though no other source can confirm his report.

,:.,Asgpected, the massacre of almost 150 Union soldiers and 3 civilians raised cries
~

of anguish among Union military and civilians alike. Even 'though the results, of Centralia
are heavily weighted in favor of the Confederate guerrillas. the guerrillas had very little
mHitary power in Missouri by the end of the summer of 1864. They were divided in their

ranks and unscrupulous:in ,their actions. After Centralia, Anderson met General Price ito
Booneville on October 11 and was ordered by a revolted Price to immediately remove the
scalIps hanging from his bridle. The Union presence in Miissouri was similar to what was
happening in the eastem theaters: the Union was overwhelming Confederate forces. Within
the month, George Todd would be dead and Prices army would 'be reduced to a mob as they
were squeezed thy Union forces on 'their retreat South. On October 25, 1864, the same day
Price suffered another devastating blow during his retreat, Bloody Bill Anderson made his
last raid. 143 After charging through a Union line, when all bur one other guerrilla had
stopped. Anderson pitched from his horse and was found dead from two bullet wounds in
the back of his head.
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Subsequently, the body of this man, known as one of the most feared ,and violent
bushwhackers for leading the Centralia massacre and writing leners to newspapers
threatening to murder Union citizens, was displayed in front of gaping crowds. His body
was photographed with a pistol in his hand, his long hair draping over his shoulders.
Rumored to have been decapitated and dragged behind a horse before burial, Anderson was
placed in an unmarked grave. Samuel Cox, a former cavalry Major and a veteran of the
Mexican War and the Sioux uprising, was serving as a civilian in order to hunt down
Anderson. He remarked that Anderson's burial in an unmarked grave demonstrated,
"respect not due to him but to ourselves and humanity."146 Union Militia were seen 
spitting and urinating on the grave by nightfall.
Even before Anderson oompiJed his bloody "rap sheet", his motivations were more
criminal than noble, and his hand was experienced in raiding, robbery and murder. The
longer he bushwhacked, as Castel and Goodrich write, "he paid a price: degeneration. For
~

;~

many-too many-the thirst of revenge became mixed with a lust for loot, causing the
difference between guerrilla and bandit to blur, then all but disappear."147 The quote
outlines the theme of devolution that all guerrillas shared, especially Anderson.
Castel and Goodrich are largely on target with their assessment of Anderson, yet
they fail to consider his ideological framework political role that he played. Yes Anderson's
impact was through murdered and butchered Unionists, yet he spoke through the only
viable currency of the time. He existed in a ravaged and war-tom environment where the
channels of political influence were violent even before the war and even more violent during
the war. Missouri was under marshal law when Fremont first gave the order in the fall of
1861 in an attempt to get a handle on the situation. By 1862 it was iUega! for anyone not
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affiliated with the regular Union army or a Union militia to carry a weapon. Furthermore,
Confederate guerrillas were shot if captured starting at the beginning of 1862. After the
Lawrence massacre, all families believed to be supporting Confederate guerrillas were
captured and taken behind Union lines. Citizens with southern sympathies were banished
from their land, their farms bwned. This fact accounted for much of Anderson's and other
guerrillas' motivation. In the chaos of Western Missouri, Anderson was a political leader
as well as a leader of men. After he was recognized as a Confederate Guerrilla captain, his
victims were Union soldiers and Union sympathizers.

The Death of Quantrill

u

_

By late October of 1864, Quantrill's game was up in Missouri. The Union held the
country more securely than ever before and General Price's late summer raid proved futile
and further unified the Union cause. Bill Anderson and George Todd, the scourges of
Missouri during the summer of 1864, were both dead Even though the social climate was
still embittered over the conflict and Missouri's western border counties were ravaged and
depopulated, Confederate guerri lias were thin in their ranks. This fact was evident when just
a little over 30 men answered Quantrill's call for a rendezvous in late December 1864.
Frank James, who Quantrill now knew since the two had ridden together on and off since
the summer of 1862, responded to the call with his younger brother, Jesse. 14S
Quantrill decided. he would lead his band into Kentucky. Connelley offers different
interpretations of why Quantrill reached this decision, ranging from the absurd that
Quantrill was bound for Washington to assassinate President Lincoln, to the probable:
Quantrill was seeking to meet up with General Lee's army, which he believed was
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surrendering soon, in order to surrender far away from Missouri. Quantrill never did
traverse the state, however, and would soon be dead Perhaps Quantrill found some sort of
familiarity in the hostile Kentucky environment because it was similar to Missouri and
Kansas in its vicious brand of personal conflict. Quantrill had lived among guerrillas since
the summer of 1862, and had kept similar company before the war. The end of Quantrill' s
life seems all that more fitting, since he died in the capacity he lived.

Many partisan bands, including Quantrill's, roamed the Kentucky countryside.
Both Union patrols and Homeguards scoured Ithe Kentucky brush and hills for the

guerrillas. According to Leslie, ''the desultory partisan war went on too, guerrillas
continued to bum railroad cars, rob, kidnap, and murder, though with gradually decreasing
frequency as their numbers 'Were Ithinned by rapacious soldiers and home guardsmen."I 49
Often men under Federa:l payrolls, were equaJJy guilty ,of robbing and murdering civilians,
as in the ,case of the gang that shot and captured QuaatriU.

-l

:"1

Sometime in early May, Connelley recounts that a guerrilla named Jack Graham was
attempting to re-shoe Quantrill's loyal war-horse, Old Cnarley. The horse had been with
Quantrill for years and rus hide bore numerous bullet scars. Known for not letting anybody
except Quantrill go near him or handle him, Old Charley's· personality saved him once after
the Quantril.l-Alilderson split in the winter of 1864. Audacious members of Anderson's
band had tried to steal Old Charley from Quantrill's camp but the horse kicked and bucked
so that their efforts were denied While being shoed, the horse jerked awkwardly and was
hamstrung. In response to the rom of events, Connelley reports Ithat Quantrill said,
career is run. Death is coming, and my end is near."l~O'

'~y
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On the morning of May 10, 1865, Quantrill's prophecies proved true. While

camped in the barn of Confederate sympathizer James H Wakefield, the scouts of Edwin
Terrell attacked them. Most of the guerrillas were able to mount their horses and

counterattack but Quantrill was unable to mount his new horse amidst the gunfire. Quantrill
began to flee on foot and while attempting to mOlIDt a horse that already had a rider, the
horse was shot under the two men and Quantrill was afoot again. It was then a bullet struck

him in his back and he fell mortally wounded Quantrill was not immediately identified
until Terrell returned to the Wakefield farm a day later. Frank James reportedly visited the
dying guenilla chieftain and offered to move him to hiding. Quantrill refused and was then

transPQ,rtedJ9 Louisville by Terrell where he died on June 7, 1865"51
F

.

At the time of Quantrill's death, the Confederacy had officially surrendered almost
two months ago. Many of the most notorious Missouri guerrillas were dead. lncluding

Bill Anderson, George Todd, Dick Yeager, William Haller, and many of the leading men in
Quantrill's band. The last months of the lives of Anderson and Todd were marked by
robbery and murder. For the small band that Quantrill had led into Kentucky, their situation
was similar. For the Quantrill and Anderson, the fourth and final stage ended in its only
plausible manner, their death and the end of the war. For the men who had begun their fight
for the Confederacy as regular soldiers and now ended their lives as hunted criminals, their
struggle to their violent end was a sequential progression of circumstance and environmental
factors. Out of all the Confederate guerrillas, it was Anderwn who probably entered stage
four the soonest and sank the deepest. For all the other Confederate guerrillas who survived
the war, especially the James brothers and Cole Younger, peace was to prove equally violent
and unsettling.
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The Civil War Ends
Lee's Surrender and an Uncertain Future
The spring of 1865 brought with it the same feeling of uncertainty to Western
Missouri and Kansas of each proceeding spring. Would the thaw mark the beginning of
further guerrilla action? Even though the prospects of Lee surrendering his ragged army
were high, Confederate guerrillas in Missouri had operated independently of the
Confederate army sine 1862 and therefore Lee's decision to surrender is not necessarily
predictive of the guerrillas' actions.
The Confederate war effort was exasperated and dwindling. Economically, the
South was devastated and the old social order that the South had sought to protect, was in a
state of upheaval. Sherman had fInished his devastating march to the sea by the end of
December 1864 and was beginning to slash through the Carolinas overcoming swollen
rivers and heavy spring rains. The confederate cities of Charleston and Columbia fell in

-,

flames. Lee's army of-Northem Virginia was nearing its end, desertion was high, supplies
were low, and army moral was eroding from defeat after defeat The South lay in ruins and
the massive manufacturing power of the North had increased thus exacerbating the northern
economic hegemony. Indeed., Lee would go on to surrender at Appomattox on April 9,
1865 marking the end of massive pitched battles between the blue and gray and the United

States Civil War.
Jefferson Davis and his cabinet, however, "remained at large, moving southward as
fast as the dilapidated railroads could carry them. At every stop Davis exhorted his people
to fIght on." According to Civil War historian James MacPherson, "it appeared to the

Union that guerrilla warfare might go on for years. Turning the South into another
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Ireland."'S2 In the case of Quantrill and General Price, the bloodshed was not over,
General Sterling Price, refusing to accept defeat, led a band of troops into Mexico.
Quantrill continued to raid in Kentucky though he was nothing more than a marauding
bandit For many. however, the strain and hard life of guerrilla warfare turned many to
swrendering despite their uncertain future.
The future was uncertain for Confederate guerrillas who remained in Missouri, in
personal tenns and in how the Reconstruction government would deal with them. Would
the men return to Missouri to pick up their pre-war lives? The role of men who fought as
guerrillas in Missouri during the Civil War would prove as varied, and in some extreme
cases, M~y bloody, as it had been during the war.
~:

~

Politically, Pro-Southern civilian and ex guerrillas would have cause for uneasiness
as the abolitionist Republicans had controlled the state legislature. . According to historian
Parrish, of the 66 delegates at the state convention, three--quaners were radicals. ls3 Once
such radical was St. Louis lawyer Charles D. Drake, who had such an overarching influence
on the new state constitution that it became known as the Drake Constitution. The Drake
Constitution came down hard on Southern sympathizers and Anti-Unionist by enacting
resbictions aimed at eliminating any Democrat influence or Southern sympathizers in
office. The Constitution said ex-confederates could not vote or hold office and be
employed in any professional position including church offices. The Constitution offered
no parole, amnesty or exemption from secessionist acts against the Union.
After the war, the Confederate guerrillas went in three directions. Some stayed on
with General Shelby and General Price who continued his campaign in Mexico. Others
stayed in Texas and took up ranching. The majority, however, traveled back to Missouri
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along the same route they had during the previous spring. The guenillas' future was
uncertain because even after the war, Missouri retained its variety of viewpoints about the

guerrillas' actions. they were viewed in many ways by Missouri's chaotic society. To
some they were cold-blooded killers who, if not prosecuted by Army law, should be
summarily executed under criminal law for their heinous crimes committed during the war.
To the Southern sympathizers Or perhaps Missouri cinzens that had suffered at the hands of

Red Legs, the ex-Confederate guerrillas were heroes of a lost cause.
For the guerrillas Ithat returned to Missouri, most would eventually surrender and be
granted parole. GueniUa leader Dave Poole, after making his return trip from Texas during
the spring of 1865 requested a meeting with Major B.K. Davis. On May 171tJ, Davis and

fi ve soldiers met Poole and five bushwhackers and Davis, operating under General Dodge's
orders, said that upon surrendering their weapons and obeying the laws, the military would

take no further action against the bushwhackers. Therefore, on May 21, Poole I~ a'lband
:~ I

of 85 longhaired grizzled young Confederate guerrillas down the main street of Lexington,
Missouri, and surrendered their weapons in front of the courthouse. Upon the surrender of
their weapons, they took an oath of allegiance from the provost marshal and received their
parole certificate. 1S4
Other guerrillas, like 01 Shepard, reputed the best pistol shot in Quantrill's band,
was reluctant to give up his arms while surrendering. 'We must keep our side arms ... for
you know we have personal enemies who would kill us at the first opportunity." With
reluctance, the worn guerrillas finally did surrender and the Clay county sheriff arrested two
bushwhackers who surrendered with 01 Shepard for murder and horse stealing. l5S
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Some bushwhackers made it only as far as negotiations. Jim Anderson, Bill
Anderson's brother, and Archie Clement were required to swrender unconditionally to the
federal commander stationed near Glasgow, Missouri. Sensing the ardent Unionist feelings
surrounding the area. Anderson and Clement felt surrender meant certain death so the two
left for Tex'as again and only Clement would ever return to Missouri.
The last confederate "soldiers" that surrendered were the guerrillas that followed
Quantrill into Kentucky after the death of Bill Anderson and George Todd. Among these

14 men who surrendered a fuJ.l three months after Appomattox was Frank James. The
majority of the fonner bushwhackers had surrendered and took oaths of allegiance. The
worst guen:tl1las, Quantrill, Todd and Anderson were dead. No doubt that the surrender of
t:'

~

these known chieftains would have produced much controversy. The emotional scars that
the Missouri war had created were not healed that summer of surrendering. Albert Castle
writes, "Much animosity continued to exist between pro-Unjon and pro-Confederate

Missourians. In particular, the Unionjst hated and resented former bushwhackers. They
believed that these men should be punished for their wartime crimes."IS6 In some cases,
men suspected of once being bushwhackers were driven from their farms and even killed.

In an ironic way, war proved safer than peace for many ex-confederate guerrillas .since they
had been constantly on guard during the war.
Archie Clement, one of the most vioiently degenerate bushwhackers, was shot by
Union forces while trying to escape from a saloon in Lexington, Missouri. Clement, in
town earlier that day in order to register for the Missouri state militia as mandated by law.
was ordered to leave but soon retumed to the saloon. Federal troops when to root him out
and after escaping from the back of the saloon was shot while riding out of town.\S7
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Ex-bushwhackers finally left an indelible mark on the town of Liberty, Missouri
only eight months after the surrender. If their existed any ambiguousness during the
delicate initial reconstruction, the robbing of the Clay County Savings Bank: once more
divided Unionist and ex-Confederates. Among the robbers that left a William Iewell
College student dead, were 01 Shepherd, Bud and Don Pence, and Frank Gregg-all once
prominent members of Quantri.M's band.
Albert Castle offers a reason based on social tenns of why a few ex-confederate
Guerrillas traveled down the outlaw path after the war.
The wild young ex-partisans found it extremely hard to settle down to a
humdnIm, poverty-tinged existence on a {ann after the adventurous life and
easy money of the war. This was especially trne· of those whose criminal
tendencies had been developed and confmned by bushwhacking. Therefore,
it is little wonder that .some of mem, exasperated and made desperate by
Unionist persecution, were unable to resist the temptation to make use of the
techniques and sk:ill.s they had learned so well under Quantrill, Todd and
Anderson. 1.~8

In this passage, Castel ,touches on many of the social and economic reasotls that
many guenillas turned out:laws. Many of his reasons are external factors and conditions
operating on the guerrillas. He does, however, note mat perhaps the Confederate men of
Missouri had criminal tendencies that were exacerbated by the environment Castle subtly
notes thar while the enviromnent developed the skills needed of successful outlaws,
something existed imemal!ly that rose from the gueItillas-twned-outlaws to meet the
environmental influence of Ithe war.
The Confederate guerrilla of Missouri had evolved considerably since Quantrill first
assembled a band of Partisan in Ute early winter of 1862. As the 'Ci vi 1 War progressed, the
guerrilla's actions, Union policies, and continued Jayhawking escalated the savages of the
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border war. Of the characters introduced, their guerrilla struggle was, in the case of
Quantrill and Anderson, their end For the Jameses and Cole YoWlger, their participation
marked a beginning of their lives as the Old West's most famous outlaws. To be sure,
banditry and abject killing marked the final months of Quantrill and Anderson's lives.
though these men had begun the war, Quantrill more than Anderson, fighting for the
Southern cause. It was their quest for retribution, however, that began their decent through
the four stages while incurring further injustice and atrocity among their victims. In the

final judgement of Quantrill and Anderson, it is not as simple as labeling the men as greedy.
bloodthirsty killers; nor, is it correct to place Quantrill and Anderson among the
Conf~_heroes of the
\.

.

Civil War. The men occupied a gory niche that was influenced

harshly by the sectional politics of the war as well as by their lives growing up on the
frontier of America Both Quantrill and Anderson spoke through the most powerful
currency of the time and the James brothers and Cole YOWlger would continue to carry the
violent and bloody legacy of the border war.

Conclusion
Even before the Civil War broke out, pro-slavery and abolitionist groups were
fighting for the futtrre of slavery in the state ofMissomi. Jayhawkers took the
abolitionist cause into their own hands, and border ruffians did the same for slavery.
When war eventually broke out, it was therefore fought by and against the people and
characterized by guerrilla activity. Some of these guerrillas, like Quantrill and Anderson,

had histories of criminal activities, whereas others, like the James brothers and Cole
Younger, went on to further influence American history after the war. As the Union
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gained control of Missouri, Confederate guerrillas became isolated, desperate, and
criminal. Through tracing the history of Missouri before and during the Civil War, these
men were examples of the violent, bitter and tumultuous history of the state.
Missouri's pre-war history sowed the seeds for the guerrilla conflicts it wouldlater endure. Missouri entered the Union as part of a compromise to temporarily assuage
the question of slavery in America Even though the state's early identity was influenced
by it being a wilderness on the frontier of America, the slavery question surfaced again in
the 18505 as Kansas became open to settlement Missourians attempted to bring slavery
to

Kansas by violently influencing elections of territorial representatives. The violence

went beyond the elections and by the mid-1850s, the border of Missouri and Kansas was

in a state of violence and upheaval. By the beginning of the Civil War the environment
was still chaotic. Because of the presence of yeoman farmers, Missouri still clung to

I.

Unionist ties even though Confederate forces were preparing to fight for control of$.e
:.Poo.

state.

In the beginning of the war, the Confederate Army of Missouri began with
enthusiasm for their cause, internal discipline, and adhered to the formal rules of war.
Men like Quantrill, Younger, and Frank: James fought under General Price. Due to strong
Unionist forces centered in St. Louis, and the fact that Missouri was surrounded on three
sides by free states, the Confederacy was unable to maintain formal control over the state.
Former Governor now General Price and the Confederate Army that he led was driven
from the state in early March, 1862. Largely due to Missouri's changing and chaotic
identity before the war, it is no surprise that conventional fighting between the Union and
Confederacy did not last long.
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Even though the Confederate Army of Missouri was driven from the state, the
fighting in Missouri was far from over. Confederate guerrillas, encouraged by General
Price and operating under the Confederate Congress' Partisan Ranger Act, continued
military campaigns against the Union in Missouri. This began the second stage oftbe
guerrilla war, which was characterized by disciplined Confederate guerrillas following
conventions ofwar such like not executing captured soldiers or killing civilians. After

General Price had been driven from the state, the guerrillas largely kept to leading
campaigns against the Unionists. In response to developments in the war, this second
stage did not last long.
. Soon, the Confederate guerrillas were considered outlaws by the Union army and
....
would be executed ifcaptured. The guerrillas' style ofwarfare began to mirror the
Union's treatment of them: showing the enemy no quarter. The guerrillas still believed
themselves to be members of the Confederate army as shown by many of them serving as
cavalry and scouts for regular infantry brigades during the winter of 1862-1863. They

were still well organized and disciplined, with Quantrill successfully leading 400 men
deep into Kansas and evading Union forces during his retreat. However, in this stage they
began to kill more indiscriminately, as in the case of the Lawrence raid.
The fourth and final stage of the Confederate guerrillas' devolution began when
they left Missouri to spend the winter of 1863-1864 in Texas. Unlike the previous
winter, few guerrillas served regular Confederate forces. An exception was Anderson's
men briefly tracking down Confederate deserters, though they were soon relieved of this
duty because they ended up shooting more men than they captured. The guerrillas onceorganized groups disintegrated as factions began to leave Quantrill's band, and their
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discipline eroded as they began to rob even Confederate citizens. The ensuing events of
the Confederate guerrillas in Missouri during the summer of 1864 resembled
bushwhacking more than military campaigns. As discipline deteriorated, these men
turned into bandits without loyalties or allegiances.
Tracing Missouri's path during the years leading up to the Civil War as well as
throughout the conflict illumjnates many aspects of the Civil War and America's history.
First, the events in Missouri and Kansas illustrate the intense feelings that surrounded the
Civil War. Beyond just the future of slavery, the conflict along the Missouri-Kansas
. border arose over the intersection of national sectionalism, territorial rights, westward
expansion, and economic factors. In addition, studying Missouri's role in the border war
is important because Civil War battles like Gettysburg and other events in the Eastern
Theater can overshadow other dimensions of the Civil War. On the frontier of America,
the Civil War was very much a war even though few massive pitched battles occurred.

....

n

Southern institutions, while firmly established in older parts of the South, were new and
evolving in Missouri. Therefore, the social and political environment proved more
unpredictive and chaotic.
Second, in light of the gruesome accounts of the actions depicted in this paper we
must ask ourselves, why did these men commit such terrible atrocities? In the treatment
of Bill Anderson, it is easy to pathologize him as a pure demon, or excuse his deeds due
to the influence of environmental and situational factors. After the war, much of

continuing animosity in Missouri existed because of inflammatory writings that defamed
Confederate guerrillas. In order to correctly understand why these men behaved as they
did, a middle ground must be found between these two treatments.
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Lastly) and most important, the stages of guerrilla degeneration explain the source
of lawlessness that would go on to be a part of westward expansion. General Lee was
aware of the result of continued guerrilla fighting. A Confederate artillery officer
suggested to Lee to disbanded into the woods to carry on their struggle as guerrillas.
Though Lee said he would rather "die one thousand deaths before surrendering to General
Grant,n Lee replied, "[the guerrillas] would become mere bands of marauders ... and

would bring on a state of affairs it would take the country years to recover from. n139 Even
though the Civi[ War ofliciaUy ended in early Apri11865, its effects were lasting
throughout the end of the century and some would even argue, it's effects can still be seen
today", Old west outlandry and frontier violence did not emerge out of anywhere but had
.:
subtle ,ties to the Gvil War and., in the case of the James brothers and Cole YOlIDger, direct
ties,
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